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This work analyzes the domestic emergency management policy of the United
States and the extent to which it reflects an imbalance in U.S. national security policy. It
tests the thesis that despite the rhetoric of enhanced emergency management capabilities
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. still remains vulnerable to largescale domestic emergencies due to a lack of adequate planning and resources. This
vulnerability stems from a failure to implement lessons learned from large-scale domestic
incidents such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Northeast Blackout of 2003. Since
U.S. security policy is heavily focused on military and foreign policy issues, emergency
response capabilities have not been a priority and are not substantial enough to respond
effectively to a large-scale domestic emergency. However, the two policy areas,
foreign/military and domestic, are interconnected and mutually dependent. Since the
threat of terrorism can never be fully eradicated, foreign/military and domestic security
policies should be balanced so that if and when another attack occurs, the U.S. can
respond effectively.
This work uses the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Northeast Blackout of 2003, and
the State of Connecticut’s emergency training exercises as case studies to test this thesis.
Interviews with first responders provide additional original research to supplement the
data gathered from online resources, articles, and government reports. The concluding
chapter demonstrates why a more balanced approach to security policy, both domestic
and foreign/military policy, is necessary if the U.S. is to be successful in the “war on
terrorism.” This work proves the thesis that the U.S. still remains unprepared for
another domestic terrorist attack or other large-scale domestic emergency, and provides
recommendations to further enhance response capabilities.
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INTRODUCTION

Domestic national security is a complicated, comprehensive issue that
challenges American political processes and structures. Whether domestic crises are
man-made or natural, national security includes being prepared to respond to them
effectively, efficiently, and in a timely manner, regardless of where or when a crisis
occurs.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there have been initiatives to
enhance domestic aspects of national security. However, the United States has
focused its national security policy largely on the ongoing military conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq and on foreign policy issues. This is reflected, for example, in
the massive allocation of funds and resources to the Department of Defense.
However, as Stephen Flynn points out, preparedness for domestic crises is also an
essential element of national security strategy. He argues that our response to
domestic crises is deeply flawed, which has negative consequences for broader issues
of national security. Despite the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in
response to the 9/11 attacks, the federal government still lags in helping communities
prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters, as was evident in the management
of Hurricane Katrina and the Northeast Blackout of 2003.
In The Edge of Disaster, Flynn addressed many weaknesses in our domestic
security, such as the nation’s aged and poorly maintained infrastructure, including
bridges, levees, reservoirs, power grids, and similar structures that are vital to the
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day-to-day activities of all Americans. The fact that these structures are deteriorating
should be cause for alarm because their failure would be highly disruptive and
because they provide an attractive target for terrorists who seek that disruption.
Another weakness that Flynn found was the inadequacy of medical care for victims of
large-scale emergencies. There are problems of insufficient hospital capacity to meet
the surge of demand in a crisis. Often medical care and basic supplies have not been
efficiently or effectively provided following disasters. While the federal government
plays a role in disaster response, first responders are preponderantly local, e.g.
emergency medical technicians, fire fighters, and law enforcement personnel. If they
do not have adequate resources (such as up-to-date communications systems and
sufficient equipment) and training to facilitate collaboration and ensure information
sharing in an emergency situation, they will not be successful in their management
efforts, causing potentially massive loss of life and economic damage.
To assure effective response to domestic crises, Flynn argues that federal
agencies such as the US Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) should not be diverted from their emergency management
responsibilities; moreover, they should be provided with sufficient funding,
personnel, and training so that they can adequately respond to disasters. This relates
in part to the argument that Richard Clarke makes in Your Government Failed You,
that the Department of Homeland Security is an ineffective organization. He posits
that it was created with a political agenda that misunderstood the problem that it was
meant to solve, and was also a poorly structured organization run by unqualified
political appointees.
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Thesis and Research Questions
This work tests the thesis that despite the post-9/11 rhetoric about change and
coordination, the lessons of 9/11 were not translated into significantly improved
means to respond to natural or man-made domestic disasters. While lessons have
been learned from large-scale emergencies such as 9/11 and infrastructure failures
such as the Northeast Blackout of 2003, few of these lessons have been implemented
into effective response plans at the local, state, or national levels. These failures are
indicators of a major flaw in U.S. national security policy, which focuses too heavily
on foreign and defense aspects of security without adequate preparation for domestic
aspects.
We are more vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters because we
are failing to improve infrastructure and disaster management plans. This negligence
has negative implications for national security. If we are unable to respond
effectively to natural disasters, how will we be able to respond to terrorist attacks? If
our ailing infrastructure is ignored, will it provide vulnerabilities that can be used by
terrorists? It is important to include military and foreign policy initiatives in any
national security policy, but it is equally important to ensure that the country is able to
withstand attacks against it, which includes being able to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from disasters of any magnitude or source. In other words, there needs to be
a balance between foreign/military and domestic national security policies in order to
minimize our vulnerabilities and, as of yet, that balance has not been achieved.
Relevant research questions to test this thesis include:
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1. What lessons about domestic disaster preparedness and response were learned
from the response to 9/11?
2. To what extent were the lessons learned from 9/11 implemented, and how were
those lessons reflected in the response to other large-scale emergencies such as the
Northeast Blackout of 2003?
3. What lessons were learned from the Northeast Blackout, and to what degree have
they been reflected in changes to emergency preparedness and response initiatives in
Connecticut?
4. What are the national security implications that can be drawn from the responses
to these large-scale emergences?
5. In what ways can U.S. domestic disaster response be improved to meet the
country’s national security needs?
Methodology
This work is based on analysis of relevant secondary material (books, journal
articles, newspaper and news journal articles) and original documents (e.g.,
legislation, Congressional hearing testimony, official government reports). This
research is supplemented by interviews with first responders who have relevant
experience in emergency response.
Additionally, two case studies will be used to demonstrate the vulnerabilities
and potential for effectively handling domestic crisis. The terrorist attacks of 9/11
were chosen because they were the first major attack by a foreign terrorist
organization on U.S. soil. As such, they tested the ability of the U.S. to respond to a
large-scale attack and serious vulnerabilities in response efforts were revealed. The
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Northeast Blackout of 2003 was chosen as a man-made disaster that affected a
significant number of people and involved response efforts that were widespread and
varied. The State of Connecticut’s emergency training exercises were chosen as a
case study to determine the extent to which lessons from 9/11 and the Blackout have
been implemented and incorporated into emergency management practices.
Literature Review
Some of the literature focused narrowly on matters related to the response to
domestic crises as areas of vulnerability that undermine national security overall.
Such issues included failures with infrastructure and problems for effective initial
response to man-made or natural disasters, which are especially important to note in
the current age of terrorism. Notable works in area include: two books by Stephen
Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from
Terrorism1 and The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation2; and a few
works by Richard Clarke: Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of
National Security Disasters,3 The Forgotten Homeland,4 and “Ten Years Later”.5
There is a substantial literature on the lessons for national security to be drawn
from the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Literature used in this work include The 9/11

1

Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us
from Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005).
2
Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation (New York: Random
House, 2007).
3
Richard Clarke, Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security
Disasters (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008).
4
Richard Clarke, Rand Beers, et. al, The Forgotten Homeland (New York: The Century
Foundation Press, 2006).
5
Richard Clarke, “Ten Years Later,” The Atlantic Monthly, (January/February 2005), pp. 6177.
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Commission Report6 and relevant government publications such as: Perspectives on
9/11: Building Effectively on Hard Lessons7; and legislation including the USA
PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
A few works focused on the Northeast Blackout of 2003. Relevant texts
include: Enhancing New York City’s Emergency Preparedness,8 which provided an
overview of the response to the Blackout as well as lessons learned from the response
to the incident; Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management
and Operations,9 which focused on the effects the Blackout had on transportation
systems and evacuation efforts; and Blackout of 2003: Pubic Health Effects and
Emergency Response,10 which studied the public health response during the Blackout
and areas where improvements could be made.
This Work’s Contribution to the Literature
The preponderance of writing on the 9/11 attacks focuses on national security
problems in terms of military and foreign policy issues. The literature on domestic
response to the specific crisis of the Northeast Blackout does not consider its
implications for national security. The contribution of this work is to analyze the

6

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Ltd., 2004).
7
Hearing before the Select Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, One
Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session (September 10, 2003).
8
New York City Emergency Response Task Force, Enhancing New York City’s Emergency
Preparedness: A Report to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, (New York City: October 28,
2003).
9
Allan J. DeBlasio, Terrance J. Regan, Margaret E. Zirker, Katherine S. Fichter, Kristin
Lovejoy, Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and
Operations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: April 2004).
10
Mark E. Beatty, Scot Phelps, Chris Rohner, Isaac Weisfuse, “Blackout of 2003: Public
Health Effects and Emergency Response,” Public Health Reports, Vol. 121 (Jan-Feb 2006).
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lessons for national security from response to domestic crises, using one caused by
terrorists, 9/11, and one that demonstrated our ailing infrastructure, the Blackout.
This work provides some insight as to how our current emergency response
plans have evolved, whether the lessons learned from previous disasters are being
implemented and whether initiatives have been successful at solving the problems
they were intended to solve.
Organization of the Work
The 9/11 attacks* dramatically exposed many U.S. security11vulnerabilities.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks a variety of groups and individuals attempted
to draw lessons from the tragedy to strengthen U.S. defenses against terrorist attacks
and enable the country to respond more effectively to any that might occur in the
future. Chapter One analyses the lessons that were learned from the attacks of 9/11
that relate to ways U.S. domestic security could be improved, areas in which
vulnerabilities existed, and how domestic security could be strengthened.
A second case study analyzes the degree to which lessons learned from the
9/11 attacks were implemented during a subsequent major emergency and what areas
still needed to be improved. Chapter Two focuses on the man-made disaster of the
Northeast Blackout of 2003. As Flynn argued in The Edge of Disaster, ensuring that
critical infrastructure is up-to-date is imperative in order to reduce attractiveness as a
terrorist target. The Blackout illustrated how vulnerable U.S. physical infrastructure

*The terrorist attacks of 9/11 resulted in planes crashing into the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania. Since the destruction caused by the attacks in New
York City was so substantial and efforts to respond were flawed, New York City is the case
study for the 9/11 attacks.
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is to outside forces and how these vulnerabilities affect U.S. national security. This
emergency also illuminated how U.S. reliance on modern technology was a severe
national security risk.
Chapter Three focuses on the extent to which the lessons from 9/11 and the
Blackout have been implemented in Connecticut. Connecticut was chosen because of
its close proximity to New York City, which was greatly affected by the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 and the Northeast Blackout. Since Connecticut is so close to a major
city and is therefore likely to be the target of another terrorist attack, it is important to
see how Connecticut has developed and improved its emergency preparedness
initiatives and response plans.
This work ends with a concluding chapter, which discusses the general
findings and the degree to which the thesis of this work was proven. Additionally,
the contribution that this work makes to the literature on the topic is analyzed and
areas for further research are identified.
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CHAPTER ONE
SEPTEMBER 11TH: WHAT WENT WRONG?

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 illustrated the ways in which our domestic
security was lacking and how our domestic response to large-scale emergencies
needed to be improved if the United States hoped to be able to respond to disasters in
the future. This chapter begins by analyzing the lessons learned from the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 that related to issues of domestic security. These include lessons for
first responders, policy makers in the federal government, and the private sector.
The second part of the chapter focuses on the vulnerabilities that became
apparent during the response to the 9/11 attacks. They include the resources upon
which first responders relied (such as communication systems) as well as structural,
procedural and operational problems. They also include failures such as breakdowns
in communication and inadequate standard operating procedures in the federal
government’s response to the attacks, as well as the lack of emergency management
plans and evacuation procedures in the private sector.
The chapter concludes by analyzing recommendations by the 9/11
Commission and other sources that directly relate to issues of domestic security.
They fall into three general categories: recommendations to improve resources for
first responders, including establishing standard operating procedures and improving
communications; recommendations for bureaucrats and policymakers, including
increased oversight of homeland security efforts; and recommendations for the
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private sector, including standards for developing evacuation plans and emergency
response procedures.
Many different groups in and out of the government investigated the causes
and implications of the 9/11 attacks. Of these, particularly influential
recommendations were made in five reports. The most prominent was written by an
independent joint commission established by Congress and the Executive Branch,
The 9/11 Commission Report. An investigation that focused on the Fire Department
of New York (FDNY) and the emergency medical services (EMS) units was
conducted by the consulting firm McKinsey & Company, titled Increasing FDNY’s
Preparedness. Several reports by think tanks added to the wealth of information and
recommendations, including two task force reports by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously
Unprepared and American Still Unprepared – America Still in Danger. A book by
the RAND Corporation provides further research and influential recommendations,
Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks. In
referring to the findings and recommendations of these various sources, the following
designations will be used: 9/11 Report for The 9/11 Commission Report; McKinsey
Report for Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness; First Responders Report for Emergency
Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared; CFR Report for
American Still Unprepared – America Still in Danger; and RAND Report for
Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks.
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Lessons for Domestic Security from the 9/11 Attacks
Because the United States had never before experienced the extent of
destruction caused by terrorist attacks on 9/11, many lessons were learned about the
roles and responsibilities of local, state, and federal government agencies, and the
private sector in responding to a large-scale disaster. Moreover, it became clear that
even if roles and responsibilities were clear and established enough to be carried out
with some degree of effectiveness, they needed to be supported by appropriate
resources, training, and formal procedures.
First responders
When a large-scale emergency occurs, local fire fighters, law enforcement,
and EMS are expected to be able to respond to the disaster in a timely and effective
manner. They are primarily tasked with rescuing and treating victims. First
responders also need to consider other factors that contribute to how well they are
able to respond, including planning and managing an organized response effort,
establishing a clear chain of command, using standard operating procedures to make
certain that the response is well coordinated and productive, and assessing the
situation to determine if more help is needed. Unfortunately on 9/11, some of these
goals were not achieved. While many first responders acted heroically despite flawed
equipment, inadequate training, and bureaucratic confusion, the response to the
terrorist attacks demonstrated the need for improved resources for first responders.
The first lesson from 9/11 was that in order for first responders to save lives in
a large-scale emergency, communications equipment (which serves a vital function
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for first responders during a disaster) needed to be updated.12 Additionally, in order
for communication to occur between different jurisdictions and departments,
communications equipment needed to be interoperable.13
The second lesson was that coordination with other departments, neighboring
jurisdictions, and representatives from the private sector must occur before a disaster
strikes in the planning phases and must be maintained during the emergency response
phase.14 This interagency collaboration is important in various aspects of disaster
planning and response, including training exercises, ensuring that standard operating
procedures (SOPs) can be integrated across agency lines, and ensuring that
communication remains open during emergency response so that everyone is
informed about important developments.15 Exercises that practice responses to real
disaster scenarios should also be held with other agencies and jurisdictions so that
when a disaster occurs cooperation between different organizations can be maximized
and carried out smoothly.16
The third lesson was that SOPs, including chain-of-command structure and
delegating roles and responsibilities, needed to be further developed and implemented
by first responder organizations.17 While technology issues were a contributing factor
to the hampered communication efforts of first responders, a lack of SOPs for an
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http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/18/terror/main618272.shtml
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0529.shtm
14
Warren B. Rudman, Richard A. Clarke, Jamie F. Metzl, Emergency Responders:
Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared (New York, New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 2003), p. 23.
15
McKinsey & Company, p. 21.
16
Brian A. Jackson, D. J. Peterson, James T. Bartis, Tom LaTourrette, Irene T.
Brahmakulam, Ari Houser, Jerry M. Sollinger, Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons
Learned from Terrorist Attacks (California: RAND, 2002), p. 61.
17
Ibid., p. 62.
13
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incident as extensive as the terrorist attacks created confusion and mismanagement of
both equipment and human capital. On 9/11, at various points throughout the day, the
command and control structure was unclear.18 Since clear leadership is imperative in
an emergency, SOPs for large-scale incidents should be developed and
implemented.19 In addition, procedures for off-duty personnel, personnel changing
shifts, and for personnel who are not assigned to the emergency need to be included
in any emergency response plan.20 Training should be conducted on a routine basis to
ensure that the standard operating procedures listed above are understood by all
emergency responders, as well as those operating in the private sector.21
The last major lesson pertained to the ability of first responders and
commanders to access and gather intelligence information and updates about the
situation as it occurred.22 First responders need to be able to determine what is
occurring on the ground as well as what is happening beyond the incident to make
informed decisions about the distribution of personnel and resources. Incident
commanders must also have appropriate systems in place to manage this information,
as well as a way to track their resources and deployed units.23
The federal government
While local first responders are responsible for the immediate response to an
emergency, the federal government has an important role to play in disaster response
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McKinsey & Company, pp. 33, 48.
Ibid., p. 14.
20
Ibid., p. 15.
21
Rudman, p. 23.
22
Ibid., p. 12.
23
Ibid., p. 13.
19
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when there is a large-scale emergency that has national implications or overwhelms
the capacity of local, state, or regional response.24
A major lesson from the 9/11 terrorist attacks was that there was no central
agency in the federal government to coordinate activities related to homeland
security. Many different agencies, such as the Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, among
others, play an active role in ensuring that the United States is protected from attacks.
However, prior to 9/11, they were spread across the federal bureaucracy with limited
coordination among them, which led to a lack of accountability.25 To ensure that
these agencies communicated with each other and shared pertinent information that
might prevent a catastrophic event such as another terrorist attack, agencies that
supported U.S. homeland security efforts needed to develop a more effective system
to encourage information sharing.26
A second lesson was that the federal government needed to work more with
local and state emergency response agencies to develop a national response plan and
implement standards for responding to a large-scale emergency.27 While local and
state emergency managers provide a wealth of experience in disaster response and are
crucial to the creation of a national response plan, other experts in the field, such as
academics and representatives of the private sector must also be included in the
24

Michael K. Lindell, Carla Prater, Ronald W. Perry, Introduction to Emergency
Management (Massachusetts: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007), p. 28.
25
Patricia A. Dalton, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives, Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in
the Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2002), p. 2.
26
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/budget/fy2005/homeland.html
27
Rudman, p. 4.
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process, since they have expertise in emergency management from other
perspectives.28
A third lesson was that oversight of homeland security in Congress was
fragmented and that “the proliferation of committees and subcommittees [made] it
hard to devise a coherent homeland security policy and focused homeland defense
system.”29 Since there are so many agencies that work with homeland security and
homeland security issues relate to other issues, there was no central committee to
oversee all homeland security issues. This became especially relevant once the
Department of Homeland Security was created. Since congressional committees are
responsible for oversight to ensure effectiveness and accountability, creating a
primary committee in Congress would streamline the process. Ideally, a homeland
security committee in both the Senate and the House of Representatives would be
able to make funding and resource decisions for homeland security initiatives in a
nonpartisan manner.30 Determining funding allocations is an important part of
Congressional responsibility. It is particularly imperative when dealing with
homeland security since without funding many local and state jurisdictions are not
able to provide their first responders and other groups responsible for emergency
management with the necessary equipment and resources to properly respond to a
large-scale emergency.31

28

Gary Hart, Warren B. Rudman, Stephen E. Flynn, American Still Unprepared – America
Still in Danger (New York, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), p. 33.
29
Rudman, p. 19.
30
The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 421.
31
Rudman, p. 10.
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The private sector
The private sector has a crucial role to play in disaster planning, response, and
recovery. Since it controls 85% of the infrastructure in the United States, its members
must take an active role to ensure that their buildings, facilities, particularly those that
are considered essential systems or high-impact targets, and other infrastructure
adhere to national safety standards and are constructed in a way that takes potential
disasters into consideration.32 Other components of infrastructure, including
communications systems, should be included in building codes to support first
responders.33
One of the most common criticisms of the private sector’s response to the
9/11 attacks was that most companies did not have adequate evacuation procedures.34
In order for a company to save lives, it must develop and implement an effective
emergency response plan, and those plans must be carried out in training exercises to
make certain that employees are familiar with the established emergency protocols.35
The third lesson applied to private sector emergency response services. In the
response to the 9/11 attacks, many private companies that engage in first responder
activities did not follow established procedures. For example, instead of getting
authorization from dispatchers to provide on-scene support, private organizations
bypassed the dispatchers and simply arrived at the scene to assist with emergency
response efforts. Coordinating with local first responders and abiding by previously

32

9/11 Commission Report, p. 317.
McKinsey & Company, p. 91.
34
9/11 Commission Report, p. 281.
35
Ibid., p. 398.
33
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established SOPs would ensure a more effective response, fewer lives lost, and a
proper distribution of resources.36
Areas of Vulnerability
The City of New York experienced a similar situation to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks in 1993, but on a much smaller scale. While terrorists tried to bomb the
World Trade Center (WTC) in 1993, the structural damage and lives lost then did not
compare to the second attacks. The attacks of 9/11 posed a more serious challenge
because first responders had not previously dealt with a situation of this magnitude.
Therefore, the systems and procedures they had in place were quickly overwhelmed.37
First responders
It became apparent on 9/11 that the communications systems on which the
local first responder agencies had relied were not sufficient in a large-scale
emergency. First, the communications systems simply could not handle the
situation.38 The radio spectrum of the equipment used by first responders to the
attacks that day was not enough to support their communications. The volume of
communications, from police, fire, and EMS, overwhelmed the system as well as the
dispatchers. This was exacerbated by the fact that many of the communications
facilities in the immediate area of the WTC were knocked out by the attacks.39
A problem for first responders that had been encountered in the earlier attacks
on the WTC was that their communication equipment could not operate in the high36

McKinsey & Company, p. 9.
Louise K. Comfort, “Managing Intergovernmental Responses to Terrorism and Other
Extreme Events,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 32 (Fall 2002), p. 39.
38
9/11 Commission Report, p. 322.
39
Comfort, p. 41.
37
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rise buildings that dominate the New York City landscape. Therefore, on 9/11 many
radios failed simply because the first responders were surrounded by skyscrapers.40
While the portable radios work better when there are repeater systems, the repeater
system in the WTC was found to be damaged as a result of the attacks.41 The old
equipment that proved to be insufficient in 1993 had not been updated even though
new radios had been ordered in 1999. However, efforts to utilize them before 9/11
were unsuccessful.42 Fortunately, the attacks did not take place on a subway or in a
tunnel, because the radio communication equipment that the emergency services
personnel used could not operate in those locations.43 The issues that first responders
encountered with communications equipment not only hindered response efforts but
also made “accountability of personnel impossible.”44
Since the repeater channels were not working the fire chiefs who were in
charge on 9/11 decided to use two other channels – a tactical channel to communicate
with the fire fighters, and a command channel to communicate with the other chiefs.45
Many of the firefighters did not know that this switch had occurred, and those who
did know did not receive all of the messages because even the tactical channel was
not operating to full capacity. Matters were made worse by the fact that the
frequency of the command channel that the fire chiefs were using was being shared
with a citywide first responder channel. Therefore, the chiefs had a difficult time
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communicating with each other because their channel was overwhelmed with other
emergency responder dispatches and communications.46
When fire chiefs and other incident commanders were able to locate their
units and determine the status of personnel, they relied on magnetic boards that were
eventually destroyed when the towers collapsed. The magnetic boards had magnetic
pieces that could be moved around the board to indicate the changing location of units
or resources. While these boards had been sufficient ways to track personnel in the
past, they proved to be inadequate on 9/11. The information that the incident
commanders obtained about their units was not easily transferable to other agencies
or command posts, and since the data could not be stored or backed up, it was all lost
when the towers collapsed.47
While first responders experienced problems communicating with members of
the same department due to dated equipment and overburdened systems,
communication issues went beyond the boundaries of each agency. Since each of the
first responder agencies maintained its own communications systems that were not
interoperable, different agencies could not communicate with each other. For
example, fire fighters could not receive updates from law enforcement officers, and
emergency medical technicians could not coordinate with fire fighters to determine
what medical resources were needed, and so on.48
Communication between departments and agencies was not hampered solely
because of technological barriers. Bureaucratic tensions and a general lack of
coordination prevented the NYPD and FDNY from sharing critical information about
46
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what was going on.49 There were no senior NYPD officers at the Incident Command
Post that had been established by the FDNY, nor were there any FDNY chiefs in the
helicopter that was hovering above the WTC.50 The lack of coordination over
intelligence and command and control led to unnecessary confusion and furthered
aggravated the situation. While Mayor Giuliani attempted to bridge the gap between
the various first responder agencies, he was unable to do so.51
Some breakdowns in procedure occurred on 9/11 within the FDNY that
interfered with the response efforts. First, some units arrived at the WTC and
proceeded into the burning towers or other areas of the site without first “staging,” or
reporting to their superiors at the designated check-in points. This led to chiefs not
being able to keep track of their units, and units going into the buildings without vital
information.52 Second, some units that were assigned to other parts of the city came
to Ground Zero to help without authorization from dispatchers. Dispatchers must
give authorization for unassigned units to participate in response efforts because only
the dispatchers know what resources and personnel are needed. Since these units did
not receive authorization from the dispatchers, they might not have been needed at the
WTC site, therefore putting more firefighters in danger, or they might have been
needed to respond to other emergencies in the city.53 Third, a full recall order was
sent to all off-duty fire personnel. However, since the recall procedure had not been
used in 30 years and personnel were not trained in how to respond in the event of a
recall, there was substantial confusion about to whom or where to report and what
49
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was expected of them, leading to an ineffective and haphazard response.54 Fourth,
because the attacks occurred around the time for shift change, responders who were
going off-duty stayed on duty to help with response efforts. Not having a procedure
in place for this sort of situation put more lives at risk and added to the heavy flow of
information and requests that the dispatchers had to direct.55
Some of these procedural errors could have been prevented if a more
organized leadership structure and more effective SOPs for command and control had
been in place. Particularly because of the communication issues described above, the
FDNY had a difficult time determining which personnel were in charge; throughout
the day there were various command posts operating without knowledge of other
command posts.56 The structural collapse of the Twin Towers exacerbated this
problem as incident command posts in the lobbies of the Twin Towers were
destroyed.57 These factors, in turn, led to more unorganized first responder efforts.
The Port Authority Police Department also had no SOPs for joint command or radio
communications procedures, which contributed to the overall confusion.58
As a result of SOPs being either non-existent or not followed, emergency
managers were unclear as to what personnel and resources were needed to properly
respond to the attacks. For that reason, they called on neighboring emergency
response agencies to provide support. Unfortunately, however, no formal mutual aid
agreements had been established prior to 9/11, so not only did the emergency
managers in the area not know what resources were available to them from other
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agencies, they also did not know how to request or direct those resources. Since the
emergency responder organizations did not have SOPs that could be integrated,
personnel from neighboring jurisdictions were unfamiliar with the protocols that
existed within the local responder agencies.59
Obtaining information is an imperative part of emergency response. Without
accurate data, emergency managers cannot make informed decisions or manage an
effective response plan. On 9/11, incident commanders did not have a stable,
continuous, or accurate source of information.60 This forced them to make decisions
that were not fully informed, putting more lives at risk than was necessary.61 The
problems incident commanders faced was partly due to lack of or limited interagency
coordination, especially between the NYPD and the FDNY. For example, if a fire
chief had been in the NYPD helicopter mentioned above, he would have been able to
provide crucial information to his colleagues on the ground to improve the response.62
Another factor that contributed to the lack of intelligence was the
uncoordinated media response. There was no video feed established at the incident
command posts, nor was there a media liaison to communicate information directly to
the incident commanders. If there had been a steady stream of information from the
news media, fire chiefs in charge would have been able to make more accurate
assessments of the situation and distribute personnel and resources more efficiently.63
So, in addition to communications issues between first-responder agencies, incident
commanders also had limited, if any, access to reliable means of communication with
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other localities, the state government, and federal agencies due a lack of secure
radios, telephones, videoconferencing technologies or other forms of
communication.64
The federal government
For many years, the national agencies that dealt with issues of homeland
security functioned well in separate departments. However, the attacks of 9/11
showed the country that the fragmented homeland security structure created gaps in
communication and failed to facilitate information sharing. For example, agencies
that are responsible for collecting intelligence on terrorists, such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), did not share information with other agencies that rely
on such intelligence to carry out their duties. What was perhaps most disturbing about
the terrorist attacks was the fact that the FBI did not or could not share critical
intelligence within its own agency. Outdated computer systems and bureaucratic
blockages prevented information from getting from a field office to another field
office or FBI Headquarters.65
On 9/11, no national response plan existed to coordinate different agencies,
departments, and jurisdictions in emergency management or to establish SOPs to
support emergency response efforts. Collaboration between the federal government
and local and state governments around emergency response was minimal, and the
lack of coordination was apparent in the lapses in communication that occurred that

64
65

Hart, p. 20.
9/11 Commission, Chapter 8.

24
day and the unclear roles and expectations that hindered emergency management
plans.66
The issue of funding and federal oversight was brought to light in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks. People wondered why the first responders in New York did not have
better equipment, why no standards for private sector preparedness had been
established, and how coordination between two primary response organizations could
have been so limited. Congress did not have a primary committee to oversee
emergency management practices or to determine how funding should be allocated.67
Since the federal government was concerned with making sure all states got some
funding, cities like New York were not always prioritized when distributing
funding.68 They were left with outdated equipment and no funding for essential
training programs. When funding was made available, there was no central
legislative committee to ensure that the funds were being dispensed in a timely
manner or used for initiatives or equipment that were truly needed.
The private sector
The first attacks on the WTC in 1993 should have been a wake-up call for the
private sector, but unfortunately they were not. As a result, companies in the WTC
and surrounding areas that were affected by the attacks did not have sufficient
emergency response plans. For the few emergency response plans that were
established in the private sector, the companies did not perform drills. If the
companies had performed drills and implemented an evacuation strategy, not only
66
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would weaknesses of the plans been identified so that modifications could have been
made, but employees would also have been familiar with the evacuation procedure. 69
While New York City had experienced the first terrorist attacks in 1993, the
WTC was considered structurally sound, and not many people imagined the scenario
that played out on 9/11 or the potential destruction it would cause. Since many
emergency managers on 9/11 did not expect the Twin Towers to collapse,70 incident
commanders did not take precautions when establishing command posts in the
lobbies of the WTC buildings.71 In addition to the buildings not being able to
withstand the impact of the planes, the communication systems in the WTC center
that supported the first responder communication networks, like the repeater system,
were not functioning properly because of the attacks.72
On 9/11, many private first responder companies and organizations responded
to the attacks without authorization from city dispatchers. While they responded with
good intentions and had probably circumvented established protocols for responding
in the past, their efforts actually complicated matters due to the extent of the situation
and the degree to which dispatchers were overwhelmed and the disaster response was
unorganized.73
Information sharing between the public and private sector was found to be
severely limited. Even though the private sector controls such a large majority of
infrastructure in the US and because the private sector is the very first to respond to a
disaster because its employees are immediately at risk, little coordination existed
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between the private sector and the federal government. Therefore, the private sector
did not have access to critical information and could not respond more effectively to
the attacks. Legal concerns are a key element of why coordination is so limited
between the two sectors.74
Recommendations
Many reports and documents surfaced after 9/11 proposing changes that
needed to be made to our national security structure to improve response to domestic,
large-scale emergencies. The five most influential reports (indicated above) included
the following recommendations.
First responders
Several reports recommended changes in equipment, substantial and
continuous training, improved methods to monitor and manage personnel and
resources, establishment of effective SOPs, and extensive interagency coordination.
These recommendations targeted problems faced by first responders in the 9/11
attacks.
Suggestions for improving equipment began with concern about effective
radio communication. Some of the problems that plagued first responders on 9/11
would not have occurred if reliable equipment had been in place and first responders
had been trained in its operation. Proposed changes included the McKinsey Report
recommendation that the new portable radios that were acquired in 1999 be evaluated
to determine if they are more effective than the older radios. If found to be effective,
the McKinsey Report recommended that they should replace the older radios. If not
74
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found suitable, alternative communication systems should be found.75 In particular,
the Report highlighted the need for communications equipment that functioned in
high-rise buildings, tunnels and subways.76
Installing repeater systems (i.e. systems that facilitate radio communications
by transmitting signals over a wider area) in high-rise buildings was one way to
improve technological issues that surfaced on 9/11.77 The CFR Report suggested that
off-the-shelf technology that integrates different radio platforms could be utilized to
achieve communications interoperability.78 This Report also recommended that first
responders receive adequate training in any new portable radio equipment. This
training should include disaster simulation exercises to ensure that first responders are
familiar with the equipment in emergency situations.79
The CFR Report also recommended that the federal government provide
funding so that first responders could receive communications equipment, protective
gear, detection equipment and proper training to enhance response capabilities.80 The
Report recognized the importance of assessing any new equipment and training
received by first responders. Therefore, it recommended making contracts to ensure
that long-term maintenance of both equipment and training programs remain up-todate and functional.81 The Report further recommended that grants be provided to
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have retired first-responders perform evaluations on the status of the different
components of urban emergency response preparedness.82
Even though first responders were not responding to a nuclear, biological,
chemical, or radiological attack, they were exposed to many hazardous materials
(hazmat) such as fibrous glass, particulate matter, and asbestos that have been linked
to respiratory illness.83 The CFR Report recommended obtaining protective gear and
detection equipment for emergency personnel so that in the event of a hazmat
incident, first responders could provide assistance to affected civilians.84 Moreover,
the McKinsey Report emphasized the importance of expanding hazmat capabilities,
including interagency training and assessing potential threats and emergency service
capabilities.85 The RAND Report also recommended interagency training to build
relationships and facilitate information sharing amongst different first responder
agencies.86
So that incident commanders and emergency managers are better able to track
personnel and resources, the McKinsey Report proposed that better methods for
monitoring the status of units replace the magnetic boards that had been used on 9/11.
The system that Report offered for evaluation and possible deployment was either a
wireless electronic command board or a portable PC-based electronic board that
would be able to back up data if the board were destroyed and would assist incident
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commanders through enhanced tracking and communication abilities.87 Additionally,
the McKinsey Report found that in order for pertinent information to be shared within
and among departments and agencies, a better radio channel structure should be
established so that the volume of data does not overwhelm communications systems
and channels do not overlap.88 The 9/11 Report recommended that Congress should
support legislation to increase the radio spectrum in a timely fashion.89
Standard operating procedures
Many of the recommendations in the various reports focused on establishing
more effective SOPs. The following areas were singled out for change: command
and control structure; recall procedures; clarifying roles and responsibilities for
dispatchers; and mutual aid agreements. To enhance the value of these changes,
reports recommended extensive training to ensure that they are carried out effectively
in an emergency.
To ensure that standard operating procedures, including a clear command and
control structure in a large-scale emergency, are implemented, the McKinsey Report
recommended that emergency response organizations expand the use of the Incident
Command System (ICS), a component of the National Incident Management System
(NIMS). This way, all first responders would have a common standard for flexible
command and control, and different agencies and levels of government could more
effectively coordinate their efforts. In order for ICS to be properly executed in an
emergency situation, the McKinsey Report recommended that first responders receive
87
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sufficient training in its principles and procedures, and that continuous training be
provided for high-ranking personnel since their role in ICS is so imperative.90
The last recall before 9/11 had occurred thirty years earlier. Therefore, many
first responders were not familiar with procedures in place for a recall. The
McKinsey Report recommended that emergency response agencies should establish
formal recall packages that identify what procedures and personnel responsibilities
would be in place in designated emergencies.91 The Report also suggested that offduty personnel who are not recalled should not be allowed to participate in response
efforts.92 Engaging in training exercises will help emergency responders understand
these procedures in addition to understanding why following them is important.
Enforcing rules regarding recall procedures is necessary to ensure that personnel are
distributed effectively.93 Specific protocols for staging should also be included in this
training because some units did not stage before they arrived on the scene and did not
receive important information to assist in their efforts, and incident commanders
could not track those units.94
In addition to clarifying roles and responsibilities for on-site emergency
response personnel, the McKinsey Report highlighted the importance of determining
how dispatchers respond to a large-scale emergency. Because they are responsible
for coordinating all emergency response personnel and resources, establishing
effective means to handle the amount of data and communications that comes in
during an emergency is paramount. To ensure effective management of resources,
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the Report proposed that dispatcher structure be evaluated to determine the
appropriate roles and responsibilities for dispatchers in a large-scale emergency.
Once those SOPs are established, the dispatchers should participate in training and
drill exercises to make sure that the SOPs are successful.95
On 9/11, the City of New York relied on neighboring jurisdictions to support
its emergency response capabilities. However, no SOPs existed for how those outside
resources should be requested or managed.96 Incident commanders did not have a
true sense of the resources they actually needed or what resources were available to
them from neighboring authorities. To remedy this problem, the McKinsey Report
recommended adoption of mutual aid agreements outlining: the resources that would
be available from each department or agency; how they would be requested and
deployed; and how they would be managed by the commanding organization. To
support these agreements, joint training exercises would be needed so that first
responders would be accustomed to working with outside personnel and resources.97
One major theme in the McKinsey Report’s recommendations was that
interagency coordination is necessary for an emergency response plan to be
effectively executed in both the preparation and response stages. The First
Responders Report highlighted this crucial element in its recommendations, stating
that
DHS should develop a comprehensive national program
for exercises that coordinates exercise activities
involving federal agencies, state and local governments,
and representatives from appropriate private sector
95

Ibid., p. 95.
Ibid., p. 36.
97
Ibid., p. 70.
96

32
entities
including
hospitals,
the
telecommunications providers, and others.98

media,

That Report recommended that non-profit groups such as the American Red Cross
should also be involved in training exercises. The First Responders Report
emphasized the importance of ensuring that resources, roles, and responsibilities are
fluid across agency lines, especially in the event that mutual aid agreements are
enacted or funding is requested from higher levels of government. Improving
emergency operation center capabilities could also support interagency coordination,
as recommended in the Report.99 In addition, a Government Accountability Office
(GAO) Report highlighted the advantages of engaging in regional cooperation so that
large metropolitan areas would be better prepared when an emergency occurs.100
The federal government
Recommendations for change by the federal government focused on
establishing a single body to exercise oversight in Congress, streamlining the funding
process, and coordinating more effectively with state and local emergency response
agencies to create a national strategy for emergency preparedness and response.
One of the main recommendations of the 9/11 Commission relating to
bureaucratic issues was that “Congress should create a single, principal point of
oversight and review for homeland security.”101 This idea was expanded upon in the
First Responders Report, which suggested that the United States House of
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Representatives should make the House Select Committee on Homeland Security a
standing committee and “give it a formal, leading role in the authorization of all
emergency responder expenditures in order to streamline the federal budgetary
process.”102 It also suggested that the United States Senate should merge emergency
preparedness and response oversight into the Senate Government Affairs
Committee.103
To assist Congress in determining how funding should be allocated to first
responder agencies, the 9/11 Report recommended that funding be based on
assessments and risk analysis to identify the areas most vulnerable to attacks.104 The
First Responders Report added that these assessments should be based on population,
population density, vulnerability assessment, and critical infrastructure.105 To
streamline the funding process and ensure that funding is distributed as quickly as
possible to facilitate timely purchases of updated and improved equipment, the First
Responders Report recommended that homeland security grant programs be
reevaluated to reduce redundant programs; that states should create a list of priorities
so that federal funding is spent in areas that need funding the most; and that all
appropriations bills in Congress should include strict timelines for distribution of
funds.106 Additionally, Congress should provide emergency responder grants that are
multi-layered to ensure long-term training and planning initiatives.107
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To assist state and local emergency response agencies in determining roles,
responsibilities, and objectives in an emergency situation, the First Responders
Report recommended that the DHS and Department of Health and Human Services
work with these agencies to establish standards and guidelines for emergency
preparedness.108 Additionally, the Report called for establishment of a “National
Institute for Best Practices in Emergency Preparedness” within DHS to disseminate
best practices and lessons learned to first responders.109 A GAO Report found that
there needed to be a clear definition of roles and responsibilities between federal,
state, and local authorities for emergency preparedness and response.110
The private sector
Recommendations for the reports focused on developing standards for the
private sector so that they implement effective emergency response plans, fostering
public-private partnerships, and creating incentives for the private sector to support
first responder communications systems.
The main recommendation that the 9/11 Commission made for the private
sector was that it adopt the American National Standards Institute’s suggested
standard for private sector preparedness. The Commission went on to say that private
sector preparedness “is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business in the post-9/11
world. It is ignored at a tremendous potential cost in lives, money, and national
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security.”111 Delineating the role of private first responder companies in a large-scale
emergency is also an important part of effective emergency response planning.
The CFR Report focused more on the political barriers to creating publicprivate partnerships that would facilitate more effective emergency preparedness.
One strategy the Report proposed to increase information sharing was to invite
private sector experts to conduct vulnerability assessments and participate in training
activities and exercises.112 Additionally, reducing the legal constraints that the private
sector must operate within when dealing with the federal government and access to
information will facilitate these partnerships.113 Specifically, the Report
recommended creating a “fast track” security clearance system for appropriate private
sector leaders, lenient antitrust laws, and Freedom of Information Act exemptions.
One last recommendation that the McKinsey Report offered was that the
private sector should assist with obtaining and installing communications systems that
would support first responder communications equipment, such as repeater
systems.114
Summary
Following the attacks of 9/11, many articles, reports, and books were
published that highlighted areas of vulnerability and proposed ways to improve
emergency management practices in large-scale disasters. Those proposals included:
providing better equipment and training to first responders; establishing clear SOPs
(including roles and responsibilities) for the private sector and at the local, state, and
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federal levels; and facilitating extensive coordination among different agencies,
jurisdictions, and organizations in the private sector.
Most of these recommendations came to light before the Northeast Blackout
of 2003. Chapter Two analyzes the lessons learned from this incident, the
vulnerabilities that contributed to the flawed response to this emergency, and
recommendations for future disasters. This analysis helps to determine the extent to
which recommendations from the response to 9/11 were implemented in emergency
management plans within first responder agencies, the federal government, and the
private sector.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE NORTHEAST BLACKOUT OF 2003:
CHALLENGES REMAIN, SOME OLD, SOME NEW

On August 14, 2003, the United States experienced one of the most extensive
blackouts in history, with power outages in eight Northeast states. Areas of Canada
were also involved. Overall, an estimated fifty million people were affected.115
Although the power failure was not the act of terrorists, many security experts such as
Stephen Flynn and Richard Clarke have postulated that an attack on critical
infrastructure (such as the power grid) is a likely terrorist event. For this reason,
lessons from the blackout must be analyzed to determine how to prepare for another
attack on our critical infrastructure and in turn enhance our homeland security
policies.
The first part of this chapter focuses on the response to the blackout in terms
of the transportation sector, health care providers, emergency operations personnel
and essential staff, the private sector, and communications. The lessons of the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted first responders, government agencies, and the
private sector in New York City to increase their emergency preparedness, which
helped in the response to the blackout.
The second part of the chapter analyzes the areas where improvements were
made. While there were steps taken to ensure a more effective response to a large115
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scale emergency, vulnerabilities still existed that hampered the response to the
blackout. The third part of the chapter focuses on those vulnerabilities.
The chapter concludes with analysis of the recommendations made in the
aftermath of the blackout to further improve emergency response. Recommendations
are focused on the transportation sector, health care providers, emergency operations
centers, and the private sector, with emphasis on standard operating procedures,
communications, and interagency coordination.
Various reports were published that highlighted lessons of the blackout and
recommended improvements in emergency response efforts. The three main reports
include: a report to New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg from the New York
City Emergency Response Task Force, Enhancing New York City’s Emergency
Preparedness; a report by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Effects of
Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: New
York City; and an article in the Association of Schools of Public Health, “Blackout of
2003: Public Health Effects and Emergency Response.” Other sources include: a
document entitled “Transit Security Design Considerations,” sponsored by the U.S.
Department of Transportation; an article in Public Roads entitled “Learning from the
2003 Blackout”; and testimony of the Greater New York Hospital Association. In
referring to the findings and recommendations of these various sources, the following
designations will be used: “Preparedness Report” for Enhancing New York City’s
Emergency Preparedness, “Transportation Report” for Effects of Catastrophic Events
on Transportation System Management and Operations: New York City, “Public
Health Report” for “Blackout of 2003: Public Health Effects and Emergency
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Response,” “Public Roads Report” for “Learning from the 2003 Blackout,” and
“Hospital Report” for the testimony of the Greater New York Hospital Association.
Lessons for Domestic Security from the Northeast Blackout of 2003
Some of the proposals for change in reports following the 9/11 attacks had
been implemented by 2003. They enabled New York City to better handle the
domestic security problems posed by the massive blackout. In addition, some of the
problems that existed on 9/11 were resolved in the response to the Blackout.
However, new problems emerged that had not previously been exposed. They
provided new lessons to further develop and improve emergency management
practices in transportation, health care, emergency operations centers, the private
sector, and communications infrastructure.
Transportation
One of the most significant issues that plagued response efforts during the
Blackout was the overwhelming volume of pedestrians, both New York residents and
commuters from New Jersey, Connecticut, and other areas outside the city. There
were an estimated 2 million people in the city every day, and their exodus into the
streets at the end of the workday on August 14, 2003 hampered response efforts.116
Since public transportation was not operating due to the Blackout, there was heavy
pedestrian traffic in the streets and on bridges, which slowed emergency vehicles
from responding to incidents.
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The first lesson from the Blackout was that better evacuation plans and routes
needed to be established. This would not only help people get out of the city but
would also help emergency vehicles in their response efforts and allow organizations
and agencies providing assistance to transport resources and personnel.117
The second lesson was that better SOPs for methods of transportation needed
to be established so that all transportation agencies would have the same regulations
in place during an emergency. For example, some bus companies and ferry
companies stopped charging fares, while others continued to do so.118 Standardizing
these procedures would contribute to a more efficient evacuation.
The third lesson was that a more effective system should be in place to
manage traffic signals that lose their power source. The lack of functioning traffic
lights led to more congested streets and created difficulties for emergency vehicles.119
This problem was exacerbated by the fact that none of the traffic signals had backup
battery power. While during the blackout civilians frequently took the initiative to
direct traffic,120 they cannot be relied upon to do so in a large-scale emergency,
especially in the event of a terrorist attack.
The fourth lesson from the Blackout was that a more effective way to
communicate with the public about transportation hubs should be established.121
Many pedestrians were not aware of the locations from which buses were departing
or what alternate methods of transportation were available. Ensuring a better way to
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disseminate this type of information would ease congestion and facilitate evacuation
efforts.
The last lesson of the Blackout was that traffic emergency operations centers
needed to be better prepared to manage an emergency situation. For example,
emergency food and water supplies need to be available so that traffic personnel can
work long hours. Flashlights with updated batteries should be on hand so that when
lights fail, traffic personnel can see down stairwells and other areas where light
sources are not backed up with a generator, and charged batteries should be accessible
for cell phones and other electronic devices.122
Health
During the Blackout, hospitals ran generators to carry on operations. Some
generators did not perform as expected, which illustrated the importance of: health
care facilities having adequate fuel to run their generators; properly maintaining
mechanical parts of generators; and testing them regularly under a full load to ensure
that they would function at full capacity in the event of an outage.
Ensuring that facilities that can be used to sterilize equipment and keep
vaccinations and other medical supplies from spoiling are accessible during a
blackout is imperative to maintain essential hospital functions and services.123 An
additional important lesson was that facilities need to be in place to assist patients
with non-emergency services in the event of an extensive power outage so that
hospitals and other health care facilities are not overwhelmed but rather can focus
their attention on patients in need of urgent medical care.
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During emergencies, hospitals use a syndromic surveillance system to track
patient symptoms in order to determine if an infectious agent has been released by
terrorists. That system was unable to transfer important information to the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene during the Blackout. The data that this
system creates is only a helpful tool in emergency response efforts if it can be shared
with key agencies and departments. The Blackout demonstrated how vulnerable parts
of this system are to failure. Moreover, it showed how imperative it is to ensure that
all components of the syndromic surveillance system are supported by backup power
sources so that emergency responders and personnel can act on accurate information
in a timely manner.
Emergency operations center
Among the variety of command centers established to make policy decisions
during an emergency (such as tactical command centers that manage emergency
operations in coordination with first responder agencies, or the command center that
the mayor and key political staff establish to make important policy decisions) the
most important command center is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). During
the Blackout, the EOC was organized by the New York City Office of Emergency
Management. Problems with that center indicated that EOC personnel and staff
needed to better prepare for emergencies, especially those where power sources are
compromised, in order to function at full capacity during an incident.124
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Communications
The first lesson of the blackout was that better communication technology and
systems need to be available to personnel. In particular, traffic personnel must have
reliable communications infrastructure in the event that large-scale evacuations are
necessary. Additionally, since traffic personnel are so often out in the field, improved
ability to communicate could facilitate a smoother evacuation process.125
The second lesson was that a more effective technology infrastructure for
emergency dispatchers was needed. The emergency dispatch and communication
system failed several times during the Blackout and was overwhelmed with 911 calls,
which indicated the pressing need to implement better systems so that first responders
can receive information and respond quickly to emergency calls.
In addition to providing better communications systems for first responders
and necessary personnel, the crisis also demonstrated the need for a better backup
system for public telecommunications facilities. During the Blackout, citizens had
difficulties placing calls, including 911 calls, because a Verizon facility was affected
by the Blackout. Since emergency management personnel also rely on cellular
communications through private companies,126 ensuring that telecommunications
companies have sufficient backup power is imperative.127
Private sector
As mentioned earlier, the private sector owns and operates 85% of critical
infrastructure in the U.S. The Blackout was an illustrative event in that it
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demonstrated how salient is role of the private sector in homeland security. If the
private sector does not do more to increase its ability to withstand an attack, whether
an attack on physical infrastructure or a cyber attack, it will be increasingly
vulnerable to terrorists.128
Terrorists, however, are the not the only thing that can affect critical
infrastructure. Human error, as was evidenced by the Blackout, and severe weather
events can also have disastrous impacts on critical infrastructure. Resiliency, or the
ability of the private sector to recover from large-scale failures, is paramount to
ensuring long-term sustainability of our critical infrastructure.
In addition to these lessons for the private sector, it was also apparent in the
aftermath of the Blackout that the government needs to collaborate with the private
sector.129 Since the private sector is primarily motivated by economic concern for the
bottom line, the government must find a way to pressure the private sector to invest in
critical infrastructure protection, by creating incentives and mandating higher
government standards.130
Areas of Improvement
The lessons learned from 9/11 led to a very different outcome for first
responders during the Northeast Blackout of 2003. Their efforts were largely
successful, avoiding the extensive confusion and chaos that characterized the
response to 9/11.131,132 Other organizations were also able to learn from some of the
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lessons of 9/11, which contributed to a more efficient and effective response to the
Blackout.
Standard operating procedures
As a result of 9/11, several SOPs were established prior to the Blackout. For
example, the staff at INFORM (INformation FOR Motorists) developed emergency
operations plans in collaboration with other agencies, including the New York
Department of Transportation Headquarters, Federal Highway Administration, and
the Transportation Operations Coordinating Committee. These emergency
management plans had previously been activated during a hurricane, a major athletic
event, and several practice drills, which contributed to their successful
implementation during the Blackout.133
Emergency operating procedures that had been established after 9/11 for
traffic patterns were also initiated during the Blackout. When the Blackout occurred,
these procedures helped control the flow of vehicles into Manhattan by closing
bridges and tunnels or restricting what vehicles could pass through. This prevented
even more motorists from adding to Manhattan’s serious traffic congestion.134
Procedures had also been established for the roles and responsibilities of
specific personnel. For example, managers from the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey reported to their respective emergency operations centers without being
told because they were familiar with emergency procedures, and employees knew
ahead of time who was responsible for opening an emergency operations center.
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Similarly, NYPD police officers in the traffic division knew the intersections to
which they should report in the event of an emergency.135 To aid emergency
personnel in their response efforts, a 1-800 number had been created by NJ Transit
and TRANSCOM so that key staff could pass on details of agency response plans and
hold conference calls.136,137
The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene enhanced its emergency
management practices following the events of 9/11 by implementing the Incident
Management System. This assisted with the Department’s response to the Blackout,
as it facilitated effective communication, a unified command structure, and
standardized procedures and terminology.138
Mutual-aid agreements had also been established by the Public Health
Laboratory so that in the event of an emergency the Public Health Laboratory could
rely on other laboratories when it needed additional assistance to carry out essential
functions. When some of the equipment failed to operate during the Blackout, the
Laboratory was able to enlist the help of other laboratories that had agreed to provide
backup assistance in advance.139
Interagency coordination
One of the most serious problems that plagued response efforts to the 9/11
attacks was the lack of interagency coordination. In the years following 9/11,
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interagency coordination improved greatly between various agencies in New York
City. It was facilitated by day-to-day operations, joint terrorism exercises, and other
large-scale emergencies.140
Transportation agencies in particular became familiar with one another and
developed relationships, which contributed substantially to the response efforts during
the Blackout. Since many of the transportation services crossed city and state
boundaries, there was an extensive amount of regional collaboration, such as the
efforts between the NYC MTA Bridges and Tunnels staff and the NYC Transit staff
to evacuate citizens.141
In addition, transportation agencies also reached out to other agencies that
supported response efforts. For example, transportation agencies had previously
established agreements with private carrier companies, which were activated during
the Blackout.142 Transportation departments also worked closely with emergency
operations centers at the local and state level, and coordinated with law enforcement
agencies, especially state and transit police forces.143
Interagency coordination occurred on both the individual and institutional
levels.144 Through day-to-day operations and exercises, personal relationships were
established. This made things easier when additional resources were needed because
someone knew exactly whom to contact in another department to obtain those
resources.145
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Some interagency coordination has gone beyond public government agencies,
expanding into the private and non-profit sector. For example, the Greater New York
Hospital Association established an Emergency Preparedness Coordinating Council
in the months after 9/11 to coordinate with local and regional agencies and service
providers to facilitate emergency planning.146
Training and Exercises
Interagency coordination was facilitated through various interactions,
including tabletop* and joint-terrorism exercises and training sessions. Training,
exercises, and real-life scenarios also contributed to preparedness initiatives, ensuring
that first responders and emergency personnel knew what to do and how to perform
their responsibilities during a large-scale emergency, and demonstrated areas that
needed to be improved.147
Since one of the lessons that emerged from the response to 9/11 was that the
Incident Command System needed to be integrated into response efforts, the NJ
Transit staff was trained in ICS during a train derailment.148 Tabletop exercises have
also been valuable in developing best practices for emergency management. Some of
the tabletop exercises were small and local in scope, while others expanded across
national borders and involved many different agencies.149
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Another important component of emergency preparedness is training. In the
aftermath of 9/11, emergency management personnel, particularly those with transit
agencies, received training so that they could perform their own jobs better in an
emergency situation, and they were also cross-trained so that they could perform
other employees’ jobs when the need arose. Moreover, transit managers who are
often in the field in an emergency received training so that they would be more
effective decision makers in the event that communications technology was not
functioning.150
Employees with the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene participated in
training and exercises to increase familiarity with the Incident Management System.
This training helped them to understand what their role and section assignments
would be in the event of an emergency.151 In addition, several agencies had run drills
and participated in exercises to become more familiar with their emergency response
plans so that evacuations and procedures were carried out effectively during an actual
emergency.152
Areas of Vulnerability
New York City had experienced other outages in the past, most notably in
1965 and 1977. However, it had been a while since the city had to deal with an
outage as extensive and long-lasting as the Northeast Blackout of 2003. For this
reason, many of the systems that had not previously been fully tested were found to
be insufficient in a blackout that lasted more than a few hours.
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Transportation
The New York City transportation system is one of the most extensive and
most heavily traveled in the United States.153 In particular, the subway system is the
largest, most complex system in the country.154 While the evacuation of the more
than 400,000 subway riders155 was relatively smooth, problems occurred when those
passengers needed other methods of transportation to reach their destinations.
The two forms of public transportation that were not affected by the Blackout
experienced their own difficulties. The ferry system that connects Manhattan to ports
in New Jersey and Brooklyn was overwhelmed with travelers on both the piers and
the ferries themselves.156 Ferry services and some bus carriers lacked standardized
regulations for what fares would be collected or what passes would be honored in an
emergency situation.157 Bus services were overwhelmed as well by the unexpected
influx of passengers who normally traveled by train daily as well as by people who
had no other means of transportation. Buses experienced additional problems
because the traffic congestion was so extensive. Problems were made worse by the
failure of communications systems, which left the transit operations center to be
unable to communicate directly with individual buses.158
These overcrowding problems were exacerbated by the lack of an effective
means to communicate transportation information to travelers. Public address
systems to notify travelers of transportation options were in the buildings that had
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been evacuated,159 and there were no other public address systems in place to
disseminate accurate transportation information.
Health
While all hospitals had generators, a few hospitals did not have a backup
power source at the onset of the Blackout because their generators did not perform as
expected during the blackout. Additionally, some generators began to run low on fuel
or experienced issues with mechanical equipment.160
During the Blackout it became apparent that patients who relied on electricity
to power medical equipment needed a source of energy; in many cases these patients
went to local hospitals in hopes that they would be able to provide some source of
power.161 Hospitals and health care facilities were overwhelmed with these patients,
as well as with patients who needed other non-emergency services, such as those
needing prescriptions to be filled or those simply seeking shelter.162
The Blackout caused some breakdowns in the syndromic surveillance system
that hospitals employed to track symptoms of patients to determine if an infectious
agent had been released by terrorists. While the main equipment functioned properly
because it was backed up by generators, the system that transferred the data to other
hospitals and the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene was not supported by the
generator. The information had to be collected manually and transmitted by
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emergency personnel.163 This system was inefficient and would have proven
disastrous if a terrorist attack had in fact occurred.
Communications
Improving communications technology across all agencies was not a
widespread initiative in the aftermath of 9/11; therefore, transportation agencies
lacked sufficient communications abilities. While older communications systems
(such as fax machines and landlines) worked in operations centers,164 many of the
transit personnel who worked in the field could only use hand-held walkie-talkies,
which only worked as long as their batteries lasted.165
Transportation agencies were not the only agencies that experienced
difficulties with communication equipment. While many agencies had developed
emergency operations plans in the wake of 9/11, communications technology either
failed or was not sustained long enough by battery power, hampering emergency
response procedures.
First responders again had to manage the crisis despite failed communications
infrastructure. The 911 system did not work as intended because the telephone
company had lost power. Similarly, the FDNY could not operate its computerized
tracking systems, so fire and EMS personnel had to be tracked manually.166
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Furthermore, repeaters* could not function without a power system.167 Since there
were no backup energy sources for these systems, or the batteries on which they
relied did not last for the duration of the outage, the efforts of first responders and
other emergency personnel were hampered.
Despite recommendations following 9/11 for improved communications
abilities for first responders, including an increased bandwidth and interoperability of
communications systems, those recommendations had not been implemented and
caused problems for first responders during the Blackout. While improved,
communications between local, state, and federal agencies still encountered some
difficulties, as well.168
Although some agencies had predetermined roles and responsibilities for
personnel in emergency situations, not all agencies had such procedures in place. For
instance, instead of having emergency operations procedures, the Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene relied on its call center for employees to obtain important
information about the situation and their responsibilities. Since the backup battery
the call center used during outages was unable to maintain continuous backup power,
the call center was not an effective means of communicating with employees.
Additionally, the call center could not deal with the volume of calls it received
because there were not enough landlines.169
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Standard operating procedures
While most agencies had emergency operations plans, some of them did not
have plans that were fully developed, effective for a long-lasting blackout situation,
or put into practice through drills and exercises. This led to confusion over staff
responsibilities during an incident since emergency personnel did not have
predetermined roles. For example, the EOC was not always sufficiently staffed, and
the staff was not entirely familiar with emergency operations plans or other agencies.
This was exacerbated by employees lacking official credentials, which slowed their
ability to respond to an incident. Additionally, command structures during the
Blackout were not consistent, which caused information to be duplicated or not to be
shared with staff who had to make important decisions that relied on accurate
information.170
Although more integrated emergency dispatch systems were recommended in
the wake of 9/11, the City of New York had failed to address this issue. Instead, fire,
police, and EMS agencies followed separate protocols for 911 calls, which led to a
more inefficient system to responding to calls for assistance.171 A more effective
system for coordinating with each of the first responder agencies would facilitate
more efficient response efforts.
Recommendations
Some of the recommendations after the Blackout had previously been made in
the wake of 9/11. Most of the recommendations, however, were new in scope, not
having been raised by key 9/11 reports. While the Preparedness Report is the main
170
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focus of this section because it focused entirely on recommendations, other reports
provided recommendations that were either put forth in the Preparedness Report or
were original recommendations, and therefore will be included when necessary.
Transportation
The Preparedness Report offered several key recommendations for the
transportation sector. The first was that a more effective, efficient, and flexible
transportation plan should be established and distributed more widely to the public.
The plan should include specific regulations for pedestrians to facilitate the
movement of emergency vehicles. The Report suggested that this plan also include
standardized, citywide protocols for collecting fares and honoring transit passes.172
In order to solve the overcrowding problem that occurred at many ferry docks
and piers, the Preparedness Report recommended that New York City explore options
for augmenting ferry services in the event of an emergency, and that any issues that
arose with specific carriers or pier locations be resolved. In order to achieve this,
New York City should also create an inventory of all ferry resources that would be
accessible during an incident, and should ensure that enough public safety personnel
would be available to perform crowd control and maintain order.173
One of the main issues during the Blackout was the failure of traffic signals to
operate, causing congestion and delaying emergency response vehicles. The
Preparedness Report recommended a few solutions. One was to install backup power
sources, particularly at critical intersections, including batteries, generators, or solar
panels. The second was to implement laws that require travelers to stop at all
172
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intersections when the signals were not functioning due to a power outage. The third
proposal was to train people, either municipal employees or citizens, to direct traffic
in the event that police officers were not able to perform their usual traffic duties.174
To ensure that these signal systems can withstand a blackout, the Transportation
Report recommended that city agencies take backup power and restoration needs of
traffic signal equipment into consideration before investing in this equipment.175
To facilitate evacuation efforts, the Preparedness Report recommended that
transportation centers should be identified so that citizens can find them and get
accurate information about the means of transportation that are operating in an
emergency situation. The Report also recommended that New York City reach out to
private carriers, such as taxis, limousines, and buses to plan for emergencies and
determine how these companies can assist in an incident.176
The Hospital Report recommended that transportation policies include
provisions for health care personnel. This Report highlighted the importance of
considering personnel from hospitals and nursing homes essential staff so that they
can be included in certain citywide procedures and have access to transportation in
the event of an emergency.177
Health
Mass care facilities, such as hospitals and nursing homes, must sustain
operations in an emergency situation to treat urgent medical needs. During the
Blackout, some hospitals ran into difficulties with generators malfunctioning or had
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concerns about fuel levels to power the generators. Therefore, the Preparedness
Report recommended that standards for hospital generators be assessed and upgraded
to ensure that hospitals can provide services (at full load capacity) through longlasting, extensive power outages. Other essential care facilities, such as dialysis
centers and blood banks, should also have sufficient backup power in place to support
them during outages. Further, the Report emphasized the need have emergency
preparedness plans at care facilities, including adult homes and assisted living
centers.178
Since hospitals and other medical facilities were overwhelmed with patients
who needed non-emergency medical care or a power source for their medical
equipment, the Preparedness Report proposed working with the private sector to
establish comfort centers. If agreements are made with the private sector to provide
comfort centers that would help people with non-life threatening medical concerns, it
would alleviate the pressure on hospitals freeing them from responding to less serious
cases in order to focus on emergency conditions.179 The Hospital Report suggested
that the city of New York provide these alternative care sites and shelters in future
incidents to ease the demand on hospitals.
To ensure that vulnerable populations, such as the elderly, homebound, or
disabled are cared for in an emergency, the Report suggested that the 311 telephone
number of the Citizen Service Center could be utilized to respond to calls from people
needing non-emergency assistance. Additionally, outreach efforts should be
continued to encourage citizens, especially vulnerable populations, to create
178
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individual emergency preparedness plans, which could include contact information of
individuals who could provide assistance to people with special needs, and plans to
have backup supplies, such as medications, food, and water, on hand for emergency
situations.180
While fortunately the Blackout did not last long enough to cause significant
problems of getting water for residents of high-rise buildings, a longer incident would
have required a system for distributing water to people stuck in apartment buildings.
The Report suggested that plans for delivering water in such a situation should be
evaluated and improved.181
Emergency operations centers and city agencies
The Preparedness Report focused on ways to improve emergency operations
and EOCs. The first recommendation was to develop a more effective command
structure to ensure that appropriate personnel are determined before an incident to
lead emergency management operations. This structure should include a way for
EOCs to contact staff designated to lead in an incident, and procedures for how those
commanders will respond in an emergency. Establishing this structure will also help
in obtaining resources to respond to an incident, including equipment and supplies to
support the commanding officer’s decisions.
The second recommendation offered by the Preparedness Report to enhance
EOC capabilities was that essential emergency staff should have predetermined roles
and responsibilities so they know how to respond in an emergency. Standard
operating procedures should be developed to designate certain staff for key operating
180
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functions, such as information technology or facilities management, to ensure that
normal functions continue smoothly. Moreover, these plans should be reinforced by
training, drills, and exercises so that in a real emergency, personnel are familiar with
any self-activating emergency plans and know what is expected of them.
The Preparedness Report also recommended that a process for providing
credentials to essential staff must be implemented. A system should also be
developed that keeps a directory of essential staff, how they can be identified, and
would include their credentials so that they could be allowed into an incident area and
provide services. In addition, a system to determine which staff would be best suited
to respond during a particular disaster based on skill sets and abilities should be used
in assigning response duties. This system should include both essential and nonessential emergency personnel. Emergency operations centers should also have a
directory of all personnel and ways to contact them in the event of an emergency.182
Some of the recommendations provided in the Public Health Report reflected
those that were given in the Preparedness Report. One such recommendation was
that emergency protocols for city personnel be predetermined, including which
employees should report to work, when and in what situations they should report, and
where or to whom they should report. In order to further enhance emergency
operations, each city agency should have a secure and easily accessible directory of
employees, along with contact information and each of the employee’s skill sets. To
ensure that these procedures work seamlessly in an emergency and that employees
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understand what is expected of them in an incident, the Public Health Report also
recommended that drills, exercises, and trainings be carried out and evaluated.183
The Transportation Report recommended that EOCs have sufficient supplies
so that EOCs can operate during an emergency.184 These resources include supplies
of water, power bars, and batteries to sustain personnel and emergency operations,
and also generators, machinery, light towers, and fuel to assist other agencies and
facilities, such as hospitals in their emergency response efforts. The Public Health
Report recommended further that these supplies be kept in a place that is accessible in
an emergency, rather than a facility that is difficult to access or far away.185
Procedures for sharing these resources with other agencies and neighboring
jurisdictions should also be established.186 Furthermore, the Preparedness Report
recommended that EOCs have a system in place that tracks the supply of these
resources.187
The Public Roads Report emphasized the need for emergency operations
centers and other city agencies to invest in initiatives that enhance redundancy. The
Report specified that agency personnel, communications, utilities, and control centers
all have redundancy built into them. Additionally, backup power should be available
for things such as key door entry systems, air conditioning equipment, building
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security systems, and sump pumps for areas that are prone to flooding, among
others.188
Standard operating procedures
While most agencies had emergency operations and evacuations plans in place
before the Blackout, several had not established such procedures. The Preparedness
Report advised that all city agencies should have emergency and evacuation plans in
place, and that drills and exercises should be carried out to test their effectiveness and
ensure that employees are familiar with the plans. Considerations the Report
suggested agencies should keep in mind included shelter-in-place procedures, how
disabled employees or other vulnerable populations will be evacuated in an incident,
and what methods of transportation will be utilized in the event of an evacuation.189
The Transportation Report recommended that these plans should also include
procedures in the event that an incident out lasts capabilities of backup power
sources.190 Additionally, the Report recommended that plans be created that have
procedures for recovery efforts after incidents occur.191
The Preparedness Report suggested that procedures for communicating with
telecommunications providers during an incident be formalized, including
notification when incidents occur and maintaining open lines of communication with
city agencies during an emergency.192
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Communications
The Preparedness Report recommended that the 911 system be assessed to
identify areas of vulnerability. Specifically, single points of failure should be
addressed so that emergency communications between the public and first responder
agencies can be maintained in a large-scale outage. Moreover, dispatch and
emergency communications systems should be assessed to determine how they can
better facilitate incident command and centralized communications that coordinate
the various emergency services agencies.193 The Report continued on to note the
importance of incorporating systems that allow emergency dispatchers to track
emergency vehicles and therefore assist with allocating resources and personnel.194
So that telecommunications services continue in the event of a power outage,
the Public Roads Report recommended that New York City, its emergency response
agencies, and private sector entities related to homeland security issues or emergency
management join the federally funded Government Emergency Telecommunications
Service and Wireless Priority Service so that pre-approved users are prioritized in an
incident. These systems operate even under periods of high demand and can support
both landline and wireless calls.195
In order to facilitate sharing important information with the public in
emergency situations, the Preparedness Report recommended that the New York City
Hall press office centralize communications to the public, rather than the Office of
Emergency Management handling this responsibility. Additionally, the Report noted
the communications systems that are already in place, such as the 311 Citizen Service
193
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Center, should be used to disseminate information to the public.196 These systems, as
the Report pointed out, would assist New York City in communicating with city
employees as well as businesses.197 To facilitate communications with the public in
the event of a power outage, the Public Health Report suggested that press releases
and public health advisories on basic health issues that are expected from certain
types of emergencies be prepared ahead of time to avoid delays if computer systems
are down.198 The Transportation Report emphasized the importance of disseminating
information to the public, and recommended that relationships with the media and
other sources of information be established, in addition to communication procedures
and strategies.199
The Transportation Report highlighted the importance of city agencies,
especially transportation agencies, obtaining sufficient communications equipment
and using up-to-date communications technology. Additionally, the Report
recommended that agencies establish noncommunications (NonComm) plans* and
perform exercises to identify weaknesses in NonComm plans.200 The Public Roads
Report echoed this recommendation, suggesting that personnel in emergency
operations centers and other response agencies should have specific drills that test
NonComm procedures.201 The Transportation Report further recommended that
agencies should have both older equipment, such as landlines, and newer
communications technologies available for an emergency to ensure continued
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operation.202 Lastly, agencies should have backup power for communications
systems, such as batteries or generators.203
The Public Health Report recommended that the EOC in particular have better
communications abilities by acquiring telephones that do not need additional power
to operate so that lines of communication remain open and functioning.204 The
Hospital Report focused on having an effective communications system in place so
that health information, such as locations of hospitals, shelters, and other care centers,
could be disseminated to the public. This Report also emphasized the importance of
informing the public not to go to hospitals unless they need urgent medical care.205
Infrastructure
One of the most pressing issues for emergency response operations during the
Blackout was the need for backup energy sources. The Preparedness Report
recommended that backup generators and batteries be maintained properly, which
includes having adequate fuel reserves, and that new installations should abide by
basic equipment standards. In addition, tests and evaluations of these backup energy
sources should be performed regularly to ensure that they are able to withstand a full
load in the event of a large-scale, long-lasting outage.206 The Transportation Report
recommended that city agencies have backup power sources at off-site facilities so
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that in the event of an extended power outage or if other backup systems fail,
operations can continue.207
Since there was such a large demand on fuel reserves to power different
facilities and equipment during the Blackout, the Preparedness Report recommended
that New York City update its fuel management plan. Revisions should take into
account what agencies and facilities would be prioritized to receive fuel in an
incident, as well as SOPs for working with multiple agencies and the private sector in
delivering fuel supplies.208 The Public Health Report recommended that the EOC in
particular invest in measures that would ensure full capacity operations in the event of
a long-lasting outage, including backup generators and batteries.
In order to ensure that critical services such as hospitals and nursing homes
can continue to operate in the event of a power failure, the Hospital Report
recommended that hospitals and other care facilities be given priority when power
grids are being restored, rather than restoring them grid by grid.209
Interagency coordination
The Transportation Report recommended that city agencies establish formal
agreements with other agencies and jurisdictions so that in an emergency situation
clear chain-of-command structures and responsibilities for agencies and their
employees are predetermined to enhance response efforts. Since command structures
often differ between agencies and jurisdictions, ensuring that the same type of
command structure is employed and identifying which personnel have authority
207

DeBlasio, p. 40.
New York City Emergency Response Task Force, p. 18.
209
Waltman, p. 9.
208

66
ahead of time will make emergency operations run more smoothly.210 To facilitate
this cooperation, the Report recommended that mutual aid agreements be created with
neighboring jurisdictions and partner agencies.211
In addition to establishing formal cooperative relationships with agencies, the
Transportation Report recommended that employees of city agencies develop
personal relationships with their counterparts in other departments so that in the event
of an emergency, employees know whom to contact in other agencies and
jurisdictions to facilitate response efforts.212 The last recommendation that the
Transportation Report put forth was that emergency planning and cooperation efforts
should have a regional component so that agencies and jurisdictions that do not often
work together can operate seamlessly.213
The Preparedness Report proposed that traffic information be centralized into
one Joint Traffic Operation Center. This way, all information would be in one place
and the more than 20 agencies that coordinate traffic operations in the New York City
metropolitan area would be able to easily locate important updates and would
encourage information sharing and interagency coordination.214
Efforts to strengthen communications abilities should be coordinated at the
city level so that resources are used more effectively and efforts are more
consolidated. In evaluating citywide communications systems, the Preparedness
Report recommended focusing on enhancing the citywide channels, installing backup
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power sources for repeaters, and expanding the radio spectrum to facilitate systems
such as emergency vehicle location capabilities.215
To ensure that effective coordination continues, the Public Roads Report
recommended that interagency coordination be assessed periodically, particularly
after an incident occurs, to determine how relationships between organizations can be
strengthened.216
Private sector
The Report advised that New York City should provide better information to
business owners during an emergency. This process would be facilitated if
representatives from the private sector were present at the EOC and therefore had
direct access to important updates that they could then pass on to their private sector
counterparts.
A second recommendation for the private sector that the Preparedness Report
offered was that New York City should engage in more effective outreach efforts to
get employees prepared to respond in an emergency. Most notably, the Report
suggested that the City provide guidance on how employees can create an emergency
kit and what supplies should be included.
To better facilitate evacuation efforts, the Preparedness Report suggested that
commercial and residential buildings should be revised to reflect best practices. For
example, buildings should have generators in the event that there is a power outage,
sufficient lighting in stairwells, and systems to communicate with residents or
employees during an outage.
215
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Since a majority of the critical infrastructure in the U.S. is owned and
operated by the private sector, it has an important role to play in ensuring that critical
infrastructure is protected in an emergency situation and that it can recover quickly
with little damage. The Preparedness Report singled out communications providers
in its recommendations, advising that companies such as Verizon evaluate their
backup power capabilities. Companies that provide communications services to
emergency operations personnel or agencies were also identified in the Report as
companies that should assess generators and batteries to ensure that systems will
continue to operate in a power failure.217 In order to facilitate maintaining emergency
communications capabilities during an incident, the Report suggested using publicprivate initiatives, particularly with smaller communications companies.218
Summary
Even though the Northeast Blackout of 2003 was not an act of terrorism, it
illustrated ways in which the U.S. would be vulnerable to a terrorist attack of this
type. While the response to the Blackout improved in some of the areas that
experienced problems in the response to 9/11, new vulnerabilities impacted response
efforts. Additionally, while the terrorist attacks of 2001 were a significant event and
caused many issues, this chapter has shown how, in many ways, the Blackout was a
more complex incident. The next chapter will take the lessons from 9/11 and the
blackout to determine how much Connecticut has improved its emergency
management practices.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONNECTICUT: READY FOR A LARGE-SCALE EMERGENCY?

Officials responsible for emergency management or homeland security have
learned a great deal from the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the Northeast
Blackout of 2003. Nonetheless problems remain. A case study of an exercise in
emergency management illustrates ways in which homeland security has improved
and areas needing further work. This chapter analyzes the third simulated Top
Officials exercise (TOPOFF) to determine how well the State of Connecticut has
adopted recommendations for emergency management in the years following 9/11
and the Blackout. It identifies the areas of improvement and vulnerability in recent
years in Connecticut, collected from a variety of sources, including several interviews
with first responders. The chapter concludes with recommendations for enhancing
emergency management.
TOPOFF 3
From April 4-8 2005, the TOPOFF 3 exercise was held in New London,
Connecticut, two counties in New Jersey, and jurisdictions in Canada and the United
Kingdom. TOPOFF exercises were mandated by Congress to occur every other year
in different parts of the United States to test counter-terrorism preparedness and
response efforts and gain meaningful insight into where vulnerabilities exist.219 The
219
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overall exercise involved more than 10,000 participants from more than 200 agencies
at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels, in addition to international and volunteer
organizations and representatives from the private sector220; the exercise in
Connecticut alone involved more than 100 agencies, organizations, and localities.221
The objective of this exercise was to evaluate the ability for these various agencies to
effectively respond to two simultaneous terrorist attacks. The simulation’s real-life
components provided a way for the agencies to gain practical experience that was
relevant to potential threats.222
The scenario in New London was a simulated attack involving the release of
mustard gas and a high-yield explosive. The exercise included components from
several of the National Planning Scenarios, including the blister agent scenario and
the explosives attack-bombing using improvised explosive device scenario. The
National Planning Scenarios were developed to assist local, state, and federal
agencies in their preparation processes.223 Many different agencies and organizations
were involved in the exercise, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the Connecticut
National Guard, the University of Connecticut, federal, state, and local agencies
including local fire, law enforcement, and EMS, two tribal nations, local hospitals and
health departments, and various private sector companies. The Department of
Homeland Security’s website provided this overview of the exercise:
Over the course of several days fire personnel
conducted search and rescue, hospitals treated the
injured (played by role players), subject-matter
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experts analyzed the effects of the attack on public
health, and top officials deployed resources and made
the difficult decisions needed to save lives…An internal
Virtual News Network (VNN) and news website
provided real-time reporting of the story like an actual
TV network would. The mock media kept players upto-date on unfolding events and enabled decision
makers to face the challenge of dealing with the real
world media.224
Since so many organizations were involved in the planning and implementation
process, many of which had different priorities or interests, this exercise served as a
good test of their ability to communicate effectively and coordinate emergency
response efforts. These agencies collaborated to establish seven overarching
objectives for the exercise: examine interoperability of communications, examining
State’s incident management structure to determine the degree to which it follows the
National Incident Management System; evaluate regional emergency response teams
and procedures; test the ability of intelligence agencies to share information; examine
the degree to which effective risk communication is carried out through interagency
media and public information systems and procedures; assess the ability of the State’s
behavioral healthcare system to assist with psychological trauma and procedures in
providing first aid assistance to victims needing crisis counseling; and evaluate
continuity of operations plans for the private sector.225
UConn After-Action Report findings
The University of Connecticut (UConn) After-Action Report, published in
January 2006, provided some insight into areas where vulnerabilities existed in the
224
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response efforts. In particular, it considered how to improve upon the objectives that
had been previously determined for the exercise. Moreover, it provided
recommendations to enhance response capabilities.
The first vulnerability the Report identified occurred in the area of incident
management. During the exercise emergency response was hindered by confusion or
which entity had authority: the Incident Command Center, the Joint Field Office*, or
the State and Local Emergency Operations Centers. There was also confusion about
how information should be shared among them. While the presence of liaison
officers enhanced information sharing, the Report emphasized the importance of
those officers having appropriate levels of clearance. The process to obtain clearance
is often lengthy, and in the event of an emergency, the process should be streamlined
so that local, state, and private sector representatives can have access to critical
information that would facilitate more informed decision-making in an emergency.
The Report also noted that it was crucial to have the private sector represented in the
Incident Management System. To remedy the issues experienced with incident
management, the Report recommended further drills, tabletop exercises, and training
in NIMS, ICS, and the National Response Framework so that first responders, state
and local officials, public health communities, and members of the private sector
could better understand their roles and responsibilities in an emergency.226
Issues with information and intelligence sharing also came to light during the
exercise. The Report recommended that communications technology in the Joint
Field Office be improved and that the process for obtaining security clearances and
226
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declassifying information be more expedient and efficient. To enhance dissemination
of information to the public, the Report recommended that the Joint Information
Center (JIC) be the only point of contact for media releases and that all information
should be passed on to the JIC to streamline information sharing. The Report also
found that information sharing would be enhanced if more personnel received
training on operating the communications equipment. Although preexisting
communications equipment seemed sufficient, personnel were not familiar with the
emergency communications systems.227
The Report offered several recommendations relating to public health issues
that surfaced during the exercise. The first was that a Psychological First Aid and
Crisis Counseling Center should be established immediately after a disaster occurs as
a way to get bystanders or victims who do not need urgent medical attention away
from the incident site. In the event that individuals need to undergo decontamination,
the Report suggested that the Department of Public Health, as well as other public
health agencies and organizations, be available throughout the decontamination
process. One phenomenon that is prevalent at incidents is the ‘worried well.’ These
are people who do not actually need urgent medical care but believe they might need
to be treated. They divert attention away from those who do need urgent medical
care. To remedy this problem, the Report recommended that procedures for
screening and treating these ‘worried well’ be developed so that health care personnel
can focus on patients with serious medical concerns. Since the scenario was a
simulated chemical attack, one lesson learned was that hospitals need to be more
prepared to deal with the public health consequences of such an attack. For example,
227
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health care personnel should receive training on how to operate decontamination
equipment. Additionally, a tracking system and set of protocols should be developed
to monitor patients, and standard operating procedures should be implemented to
determine if and how potentially affected staff should be allowed back into health
care facilities.228
The last area addressed in the Report’s findings was that of business
continuity and the involvement of the private sector. The Report recommended that
procedures for private sector representation in the EOC should be formalized and that
private sector officials should be involved with emergency preparedness training and
domestic response initiatives. These efforts could be supported by having the private
sector and non-governmental organizations collaborate with communities to
determine where shelters should be located, how they should be run, and what
community resources would be necessary in an incident. Lastly, since the private
sector accounts for 85% of critical infrastructure in the U.S., the Report
recommended more substantial efforts should be made to evaluate critical
infrastructure, conduct exercises, ensure backup systems, and identify single points of
failure that could be addressed in redundancy efforts.229
Areas of Improvement
The State of Connecticut has made advances in its emergency management
practices and has implemented initiatives to give more resources to first responders.
The following section highlights these improvements for first responders, mutual aid
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and regional cooperation, public outreach efforts, training and exercises, and the
private sector and critical infrastructure protection.
First responders
In 2005, Governor Rell signed a directive that made the National Incident
Management System (NIMS) the standard system used by first responders in
responding to domestic incidents and emergency situations. That enabled
municipalities to qualify for federal grants. In order to facilitate incorporating this
system into the practices of response agencies, the Connecticut Department of
Emergency Management and Homeland Security (CT DEMHS) established five
regions and an implementation plan to effectively coordinate and execute planning,
training, and response efforts.
A one-channel analog simulcast system, called the Connecticut Statewide
Police Emergency Radio Network was launched in 2008, which provided
interoperability for law enforcement agencies across the state. This network can be
used with stationary and mobile communications units and provides 97% coverage of
mobile communications systems throughout Connecticut.230
In order to improve communications capabilities, the CT DEMHS has
provided guidance on how to operate a very high frequency (VHF) radio system,
which is used to facilitate communications between all the municipalities in
Connecticut. This system has five different radio frequencies, each of which is
designated to a CT DEMHS region.
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The ICALL/ITAC system* has also been implemented and expanded with the
deployment of more than 1,100 portable 800 MHz radios to emergency response
command staff such as fire and police chiefs and local emergency managers. These
radios provide crucial interoperability for essential command staff during incidents in
Connecticut. This program has also been supported by the statewide distribution of
Statewide Tactical On-Site Communications boxes.231 Another system that has been
utilized in Connecticut is the State Tactical on Scene Channel, which provides radio
communications interoperability at an incident through already existing radio
technology.232
Even though non-traditional first responders do not have to be NIMS or ICS
compliant, the CT DEMHS provided trainings and seminars in NIMS and ICS from
2007 to 2008. Training and distance learning components have also been utilized by
the CT DEMHS to increase the number of traditional first responders such as police,
fire, and EMS with NIMS training. This enables the individuals invited to receive
such training without increasing the financial burdens already borne by local first
responder agencies.233
To further support interoperability in communications, the State
Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP) was established in 2007, which
includes strategies for improving communications interoperability in the short and
long term. Additionally, the Tactical Interoperability Communications Plan was
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developed for each of the five regions. This plan lays out the procedures for how
communications will be carried on in an incident now rather than in the long term.234
These plans are supported by the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant
Program, which also provides funding for developing procedures for these systems as
well as performing training in their operations.235 The Communications Unit Leaders
are another component of the SCIP. They are trained personnel who assist the
incident commander in setting up communications systems that support command
and control and interoperability functions during response efforts.236
The Housatonic Valley Planning Region provides a specific example of where
improvements have been made. Along with training and drills to improve emergency
preparedness and response, the region has taken additional steps to enhance its ability
to respond in an incident. For example, activities to support a hazardous materials
(hazmat) response team for the area have been implemented, and new
videoconferencing equipment was installed in 2004. This aides command staff
during incidents and provides images of incidents and maps to enhance coordination
between different jurisdictions or agencies.237
In terms of providing urgent medical care to victims of emergencies, the State
of Connecticut has purchased a mobile hospital with a 100-patient capacity. This
facility could be deployed to any part of Connecticut and could be assembled without
much notice. Personnel from the Connecticut Medical Assistance Team, the group
that would staff the mobile hospital in an incident, have received training so that they
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are familiar with the facility and can use it effectively. This team has also been
specifically trained to know how to respond to and use equipment for a contamination
incident.238
Mutual aid and regional cooperation
From 2008-2009, the CT DEMHS helped create Regional Emergency
Planning Teams (REPTs). These teams enhance regional cooperation efforts in each
of the five regions and are comprised of personnel from multiple jurisdictions and
agencies. They have been a key component in leading needs-assessments in their
regions and developing a regional emergency operations plan.239 Furthermore, the
CT DEMHS is collaborating with these teams, as well as with regional planning
organizations, to establish procedures between the five regions to support regional
resource sharing, communications, and emergency service coordination during an
incident.240
The Connecticut Department of Public Health has also encouraged regional
cooperation in recent years. In 2006, ten municipalities signed a regional mutual aid
agreement to be used during a public health emergency. This is intended to ensure
that if one city or town is overwhelmed by the demand on health facilities, supplies,
or personnel, procedures are in place for other localities to contribute to response
efforts.241
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Public concerns
From 2005-2006, the CT DEMHS made extensive efforts to educate the
public about emergency preparedness. These efforts included presentations by top
officials in the CT DEMHS, informational brochures placed in major newspapers
throughout the state, and a public education campaign focused on emergency
preparedness and issues related to terrorism.242
In 2005, the CT DEMHS partnered with the statewide public affairs network
to provide broadcasts of emergency operations centers during emergencies. This
initiative provides an outlet for the public to receive accurate and up-to-date
information during an incident.243 Public education efforts were continued in 2006
and 2007 with public service announcements on radio and television stations,
messages on buses and trains, and an outreach campaign to children on a popular
children’s television channel.244 From 2007 to 2008 more public announcement
campaigns were undertaken through various media outlets to reach diverse parts of
the population, including people for whom Spanish is the primary language. In
addition to the standard newspaper, radio, and television ad campaigns that had been
used in the past, Internet advertisements were also utilized to raise emergency
preparedness awareness.
Some residents in Connecticut are particularly at risk of potential exposure to
hazmat due to their close proximity to the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant in
Waterford, CT. Public education events were organized from 2006 to 2007 to notify
residents of the risk and to provide information on how to prepare for a radiological
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threat. Meetings with representatives from the plant and from the surrounding
communities were held to discuss potential issues and questions raised by local
residents.
The CT DEMHS worked with the National Weather Service and the CT
Department of Education in 2007 and 2008 to install public alert radios in all the
public schools in Connecticut so that schools can receive accurate and up-to-date
information on severe weather threats.245 In 2008 and 2009, the CT DEMHS
contributed to the development and installation of a statewide Emergency
Notification System, which would disseminate information through an Internet based
system to Connecticut citizens in the event of an emergency.246 Additionally, the
City of New Haven has developed a system that would send warning messages to
citizens, via phone or email, about severe weather threats.247
Training and exercises
Since the Northeast Blackout of 2003, various drills and exercises have been
executed in Connecticut to test the State’s ability to respond to an emergency. Some
of these activities are specific to threats that exist in Connecticut, such as radiological
plume release drills in the communities neighboring the Millstone Nuclear Power
Plant, which took place every year from at least 2004 to 2007. Others are more
general in scope, such as tabletop exercises and continuity of operations tests for a
pandemic influenza event, hurricane and winter storm drills and tabletop exercises,
and a Strategic National Stockpile drill.
245
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Some of the exercises focused on the ability of an area to respond effectively
to an incident. Host community drills occurred in the Storrs/Mansfield and the
Norwich areas between 2004 and 2007.248 Two other examples of regional drills
occurred when the Housatonic Valley Planning Region conducted a hazmat drill in
2006 and a pandemic drill in 2008 using the region’s new mobile field hospital.249
Smaller scale exercises like these happen frequently throughout the State of
Connecticut to ensure that municipalities or certain regions can respond effectively to
an incident.
In 2007, an exercise was conducted to test the state’s newly developed
continuity of operations plans. In that same year, the Urban Search and Rescue Team
participated in training to enhance their ability to respond to heavy vehicle and
machinery incidents and to effectively employ the Incident Command System.
Furthermore, the Urban Search and Rescue Team was involved with an exercise that
tested their ability to respond to a building collapse that was followed by a hazmat
explosion.250 The CT DEMHS also participated in a nationwide drill in 2006 to test
preparedness for a major hurricane.251
Emergency operations centers and the CT DEMHS
In 2006, Homeland Security grant funds helped establish the municipal high
band radio initiative, which provides communications capabilities between
municipalities and CT DEMHS regional offices. HAM radios were also deployed at
each of the five regional offices to facilitate information sharing during an incident.
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To assist with flood mitigation planning, evacuation planning, and debris
removal, the first phase of implementing a Geographic Information System began in
2006. This type of system can produce detailed maps that can provide important
information to emergency managers following an emergency and can support
response efforts. This initiative is further enhanced with the new Geospatial lab that
was added to the EOC and GIS experts volunteered to assist with GIS data collection
and analysis during drills, exercises, and real life incidents.252
In 2008, the CT DEMHS established a WebEOC application, which facilitates
information sharing and communications for emergency managers during response
and recovery efforts through the Internet. Training was also provided to all CT
DEMHS employees as well as personnel with local emergency management agencies
and the private sector.253
Private sector and critical infrastructure protection (CIP)
A Critical Infrastructure Unit was established in 2005 to assist with efforts to
protect critical infrastructure in the state. As of 2006, the Critical Infrastructure Unit
has brought in $850,000 in grants to support CIP initiatives. One initiative aims to
improve the ability of local law enforcement agencies by providing physical
protection and security for infrastructure that has been identified as “critical” by the
Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, risk assessments of critical
infrastructure have been conducted by this unit, including security assessments of
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certain transportation sites such as port, rail lines254 and bus depots, which have
provided guidance on what areas should be improved.255
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, which struck Louisiana and Mississippi in
2005, debris was left all over the coastlines and took months to clear. To prevent this
problem from becoming a reality in Connecticut in the event of a major hurricane, the
State has entered into contracts with companies that provide debris removal services
in the event of a hurricane or other severe weather incident.256
Evacuation and mass care sheltering
Planning for evacuation procedures and sheltering/mass care facilities began
in late 2005 and resulted in a Regional Evacuation and Shelter Guide for emergency
managers. These guides provide information on shelter locations and evacuation
routes. The CT DEMHS coordinated with several other agencies and groups to
ensure that there would be universal access to shelters in an emergency. Such
facilities would be preplanned, adequately equipped and operated to support a large
group of people, including persons with disabilities or older adults.257 To facilitate
evacuation planning, the Connecticut Department of Transportation has acquired GIS
programming and is working on an inventory of important traffic information such as
speed limits, road capacities, and underpass measurements.258
From 2006 to 2007, the CT DEMHS provided local emergency managers with
information on how to establish Local Distribution Points (LDPs). These are sites
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where FEMA supplies such as food, water, and tents can be distributed to citizens in
the event of an emergency. To facilitate this process, CT DEMHS drafted a
Commodities Distribution Standard Operating Procedure for emergency managers,
which gives further guidance on how FEMA supplies should be requested and
procedures for how to handle and distribute the supplies once they are received.259
One example of an evacuation plan that has been established was developed
by Fairfield County. In the event that an evacuation order is declared for a major
hurricane, the Merritt Parkway and I-95 would have all lanes going north to ease
traffic congestion. Procedures for bus transportation have also been included in these
hurricane evacuation plans. In New Haven, for instance, school bus drivers have
been contracted to assist with evacuating citizens in the event of a hurricane or major
weather event.260
The City of New Haven has determined recently constructed schools where
shelters could be established that have backup power from generators and food
vending companies that would be willing to contribute food in an emergency. To
ensure that persons in New Haven with disabilities or special needs are evacuated, a
directory of these citizens has been created so that they may be assisted during an
evacuation. 261
Personal Accounts from First Responders
While there has been significant progress made in Connecticut, particularly
for first responders, there are still areas where vulnerabilities remain. Interviews were
conducted with two fire fighters and one police officer to identify some of the
259
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challenges that first responders face across the State, as well as improvements that
have been made.
The first interview was conducted with a Fire Inspector/Firefighter with the
Mohegan Tribal Fire Department (MTFD) on April 11, 2010. The second interview
was with a volunteer Fire Captain with the Southbury Fire Department (SFD) on
April 11, 2010. The third interview was with a Sergeant with the New Haven Police
Department (NHPD) on April 21, 2010. The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to an
hour and were conducted both in person and on the phone.
Communications
While there have been advances in communications technology, there are
considerable differences among the three first responder departments whose members
were interviewed in terms of the extent to which communications systems have been
updated to support interoperability. The MTFD has obtained portable radios from
other departments but this system has not worked well. Rather than using the existing
radio system to contact other departments, the MTFD has one radio for each
department that they must use to get in touch with separate departments. For
example, the MTFD has one radio to contact the Norwich Fire Department, one radio
to contact the Groton Fire Department, and so on. This is an inefficient system and
would cause major gaps in communication if a large-scale emergency requiring
extensive interagency coordination ever occurred. There is a system in place called
VOIP (voice over Internet providers) that has been demonstrated at training sessions,
which will allow patching of communications between different departments.
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However, in the event of a power outage or technology failure, communications
would not be supported since this system operates through the Internet.
For the SFD, upgrades have been implemented but problems still remain in
contacting other people. For example, more space is available to use on the radio
spectrum, creating more channels, but there are still glitches with the high-band
system that was recently installed. Overall, interoperability in the area has improved
significantly since 9/11, and officers can talk to each other when an incident occurs
and requires response of various agencies and departments.
There is a scan channel on which the NHPD can call neighboring police
departments. This scan channel also allows NHPD officers to monitor the New
Haven Fire Department and ambulance services in the city, but does not allow them
to monitor neighboring communities’ EMS or fire services. The NHPD has also
begun installing the equipment that supports the Connecticut Statewide Police
Emergency Radio Network in patrol cars, but it is not a department-wide resource
yet. This system has given the NHPD better communications ability with
jurisdictions that are not supported by the scan channel (in other words, with
jurisdictions that do not neighbor New Haven), although it could be streamlined even
more. As it operates now, the Connecticut State Police runs the system, and local
departments must go through the State Police in order to contact other departments.
Interagency coordination and mutual aid agreements
According to the Fire Inspector from the MTFD, tensions still exist, and
several agencies are territorial when responding to an incident. However, interagency
training and information sharing has improved in the area. Other departments have
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toured the MTFD facility and attended trainings to become familiar with the
resources the MTFD has and can contribute when mutual aid is necessary; these
activities have been helpful to determine where gaps in resources and training,
particularly with specialty training, exist. While certain departments and personnel
have become familiar with MTFD resources, this knowledge has yet to be fully
translated into mutual aid agreements or passed on to other departments that have not
participated in tours or training sessions. Cross training has occurred with other
departments, although, in various emergency management practices; for instance, the
MTFD received training about its command structure from the Norwich Fire
Department. Furthermore, the local Incident Management Team, comprised of chiefs
from various departments, has received specialized training to support the incident
commander during an emergency. Training is also conducted with the MTFD and
local EMS for special response situations, such as confined spaces. Hazmat and
radiation exercises are conducted with first responders from the sub base in Groton,
as well.
While some tension exists between the SFD or other local fire departments
and local police departments, interagency coordination is relatively effective.
Training is conducted as frequently as possible, and there are efforts to learn about
the different resources of other departments. In the event that mutual aid is required,
an officer from the SFD will contact a dispatcher to tell him or her what resources are
needed and the dispatcher will locate those resources and dispatch other departments
to the scene. However, while training between different departments and agencies
has been implemented, regional drills and exercises have been not conducted.
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The NHPD participates in mutual aid regularly with day-to-day events and
also coordinates with the State Police when additional assistance is needed. Although
interagency training occurs with specialized units such as the Bomb Squad and
SWAT teams, there is no department-wide training with other departments or
agencies.
Standard Operating Procedures
The Fire Inspector explained some of the challenges that the MTFD and local
fire departments still experience during an incident in regard to SOPs. One such
vulnerability is that SOPs for unassigned personnel have yet to be fully established.
This leads to a lack of accountability when unassigned personnel arrive at scenes in
their personal vehicles and fail to report to a staging area to receive important
information. Additionally, different credentialing protocols cause confusion when
multiple jurisdictions respond to an incident. There are emergency operations plans
in place, however, that define roles and responsibilities for casino personnel (in
addition to members of the MTFD) and an evacuation plan has been developed for
each department in the Mohegan Casino to assist the MTFD in evacuating guests.
The MTFD has implemented ICS, but issues still remain with plain language and
standardized terminology. Vehicle identification has yet to fully incorporate
standardized terminology, and local police departments still operate using their own
specific codes.
The SFD has implemented NIMS, and although it works relatively well, there
is still some confusion. This is likely to resolve itself with more time and practice.
The SFD has made a shift to using plain language. However, these efforts have been
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complicated by the fact that local police departments still use departmental codes that
are not standard for NIMS or ICS. Staging protocols for personnel have also been
established and have been effective in tracking personnel in incident response efforts.
The NHPD officer has no recollection of receiving NIMS or ICS training, so
the extent to which they have been implemented is unclear. The NHPD uses its own
codes that differ from other police departments or first responder agencies, and its
command structure does not conform to any standardized procedures. Most protocols
for responding to an incident are developed on the fly and are not formalized.
Equipment and resources
The MTFD has two sets of personal protective equipment that have been
provided through the tribe and federal and state grants and are not standard issue.
The MTFD has also been equipped with hazmat decontamination trailers and meters,
as well as Geiger counters (a portable device used to detect ionizing radiation or
nuclear radiation) and a small chemical lab. To track resources and personnel, fire
chiefs and incident commanders with the MTFD still rely largely on low-technology
systems, such as pen and paper or white boards. Some are beginning to use software
and laptops, but these systems are more expensive.
The SFD has CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosives) equipment in addition to hazmat and blood borne pathogens suits. They
also have meters to detect these agents and decontamination showers that can be set
up in the event of exposure. Members of the SFD have participated in training to
prepare for hazmat or other terrorist incidents, although the trainings have decreased
in frequency in the years after 9/11. Officers with the SFD have more advanced
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technology to track personnel, which involve ‘touch-and-track’ scans that scan
personnel into a software system so that personnel can be monitored and moved
around electronically. The SFD also uses a system that provides critical information
for personnel, including contact information and medical records.
The NHPD provides personal protection equipment such as hazmat suits for
the specialized units; however, this equipment is not standard issue. Some officers
have been provided portable radiation detectors that are helpful in train stations or
with suspicious packages or luggage, but these are not provided department-wide.
Recommendations
Based on the information gathered from the different reports, newspaper
articles and agency websites, in addition to the insight offered by the three first
responders, the following recommendations would contribute to effective emergency
preparedness initiatives and response efforts.
Communications
Interoperability of communications remains a challenge throughout the State
of Connecticut. A system like the Connecticut Statewide Police Emergency Radio
Network should be developed and implemented across the State so that police, fire,
and EMS can communicate with each other. If this network is used, however, it
should eliminate the State Police as the go-between and should rather just connect
first responders directly. To ensure that communications capabilities are maintained
in the event of a large-scale power outage, plans to be followed in the event of a
communications failure should be developed and implemented, along with training
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and exercises so that personnel are familiar with the procedures, and weaknesses are
identified prior to such an event occurring.
Interagency coordination and mutual aid agreements
More extensive interagency coordination should be implemented, particularly
with training sessions and regional exercises so that departments and agencies are
more familiar with each other and with resources at other departments. It would be
beneficial for the SFD and NHDP to engage in regional training and exercises with
agencies and departments in New York City so that in the event of a catastrophic
event in the NYC metropolitan area interagency coordination would be successful
and effective. Training and exercises could either be functional in nature (i.e.
focusing on how ICS will be employed or mutual aid agreements will be carried out)
or situational (i.e. what would happen in the event of a nuclear attack on the
MetroNorth rail line or an outbreak of anthrax). These advances should be reflected
in mutual aid agreements so that there is a clearer sense of what resources would be
available from each department during a certain type of incident.
Standard operating procedures
More detailed SOPs for off-duty and unassigned personnel need to be
developed and practiced so that accountability is not compromised in a response
effort. Credentialing procedures should be standardized across the State so that
personnel receive identical identification tags depending on their role or certification
so they can be quickly and easily identified. Police departments across the State need
to become compliant with standards of NIMS and ICS so that response efforts
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involving law enforcement, fire, and EMS services can be more effectively
coordinated.
Equipment and resources
All first responders should be provided personal protective equipment so that
their ability to respond in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event are not
compromised because they do not have sufficient equipment to protect themselves.
More advanced systems to track personnel and resources should be installed across
the State so that there is a more accurate record of their deployment that can be
backed up in the event that the central system is destroyed.
Summary
Progress has been made in the State of Connecticut to enhance its ability to
respond to an incident, largely due to lessons learned from previous emergencies,
including 9/11 and the Northeast Blackout of 2003. They have been further tested by
the federal TOPOFF 3 exercise. However, further improvements are needed so that
in the event of a large-scale emergency that involves multiple jurisdictions and
agencies, first responders can effectively respond to the incident.
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CONCLUSION

This work was undertaken to test the thesis that although following the 9/11
attacks many proposals were made to improve the country’s ability to respond to
large-scale domestic emergencies, the lessons of 9/11 did not result in substantially
improved response capabilities. Therefore, the U.S. is more vulnerable to terrorist
attacks and other large-scale emergencies. Few of the lessons from large-scale
emergencies such as the 9/11 attacks and the Northeast Blackout of 2003 have been
incorporated into emergency management plans and practices at the local, state, and
federal levels. There is a significant imbalance between the heavy focus on initiatives
abroad and those that would improve domestic response capabilities. This reflects a
glaring weakness in U.S. national security policy.
To test this thesis, this work addressed five main research questions. First,
what lessons about domestic disaster preparedness and response were learned from
the response to 9/11? Second, to what extent were the lessons learned from 9/11
implemented, and how were those lessons reflected in the response to other largescale emergencies such as the Northeast Blackout of 2003? Third, what lessons were
learned from the Northeast Blackout, and to what degree have they been reflected in
changes to emergency preparedness and response initiatives in Connecticut? Fourth,
what are the national security implications that can be drawn from the responses to
these large-scale emergences? Lastly, in what ways can the U.S. domestic disaster
response be improved to meet the country’s national security needs?
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The first part of this chapter summarizes key findings and trends. The second
part analyzes the implications for national security. The third part outlines how this
work contributes to the literature. The chapter concludes by identifying areas for
future study.
Findings
The analysis from the first three chapters revealed that problems still remain
in the ability of the U.S. to respond to large-scale emergencies. While some
improvements have been made for first responders, including advances in
communications systems, they still remain unprepared to respond to a large-scale
domestic emergency. First responders are an integral component of response efforts,
yet they still lack adequate training, equipment, sophisticated tracking systems, or
sufficient interagency communication abilities.
Cooperation between neighboring jurisdictions has improved and there have
been some efforts to coordinate across state borders. For example, transportation
agencies in New York and Connecticut work together regularly and have created a
committee to facilitate information sharing. Despite these efforts, however, regional
cooperation is still lacking. If a large-scale incident ever occurred again in New York
City, first responders from Connecticut, particularly from New Haven County, would
not be familiar with New York City’s emergency management practices. If more
regional exercises and trainings were undertaken, first responders in Connecticut
would be better prepared to assist New York City. As some of the National Planning
Scenarios show, a terrorist attack could potentially affect many people or have a wide
impact-area, necessitating the activation of mutual aid agreements with neighboring
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cities or states. Due to this potentiality, mutual aid agreements need to be reinforced
and more interagency training and exercises should be carried out.
Standard operating procedures are not as extensively adopted as they should
be. For example, police officers in New Haven are not familiar with the National
Incident Management System or the Incident Command System structure. That raises
two questions for which, so far, there is insufficient data. How many other first
responders have yet to be trained in these critical programs? Do they have the
resources to respond effectively to a large-scale emergency? Throughout the nation,
compliance with NIMS and ICS should be statewide and strengthened with training
and exercises. While mutual aid agreements exist, they often do not include an
inventory of the resources that other jurisdictions would be able to contribute.
Additionally, credentialing needs to be more standardized so that first responders
from different agencies or jurisdictions can be allowed on-scene to support response
efforts.
The State of Connecticut has not yet been the target of a terrorist attack, so it
is impossible to have an accurate sense of how prepared it is to manage a large-scale
emergency. While exercises like TOPOFF 3 provide insight into Connecticut’s level
of preparedness, nothing short of an actual terrorist attack or other serious incident
will reveal all the weaknesses that exist in emergency management practices.
However, the State of Connecticut should continue to refine its program of simulated
large-scale emergencies like TOPOFF 3 to improve its capacity to respond and
recover.
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Implications for National Security
To be secure, a nation must seek to reduce the potential for attack from
abroad, but because complete security against such attacks is never possible, it must
also develop rapid, effective response capabilities for large-scale emergencies at
home. Following the 9/11 attacks the U.S. has emphasized the former, viewing
national security as an issue of “war” against foreign terrorists that involves major
military and foreign policy initiatives. That strategy has dominated policy for
domestic homeland security as well by focusing heavily on intelligence and
investigation. Yet actual security in each area is weakened if both are not
strengthened. Rather than considering them as two entirely different policy areas, the
ways in which they support each other and interconnect should be emphasized. One
cannot have an effective military and foreign security policy without an effective
domestic security policy, and vice versa. No matter how much the U.S. focuses on
issues abroad, if the U.S. cannot provide adequate resources and training
domestically, it will not be able to respond to and recover from a large-scale
emergency. Since security analysts maintain that it is inevitable that the U.S. will be
the target of another terrorist attack, more focus should be given to ensuring that our
domestic emergency response capacity is robust and aggressive.
Contribution to the Literature
This work contributes two important things to the literature. The first is a
detailed analysis of two large-scale domestic emergencies, the 9/11 attacks and the
Northeast Blackout of 2003. These two events have not previously been studied
together in such depth, nor have the relevant reports and articles published about them
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been compiled into one work. There are many similarities between these two events
that illustrate how domestic emergency preparedness is still viewed as different, and
to a certain degree less important, than the “war on terrorism” as defined by the Bush
administration. This work’s analysis demonstrates the implications for national
security that were inherent in the flawed responses to these incidents.
The second significant contribution is an analysis of the degree to which
lessons from 9/11 and the Blackout have been implemented using one state,
Connecticut, as a case study. While the University of Connecticut prepared an AfterAction Report following the TOPOFF 3 exercise, this exercise and subsequent report
only focused on one area of Connecticut and its ability to respond to a certain type of
disaster. This study went beyond that report by demonstrating areas of improvement
or weakness in the years following the TOPOFF 3 exercise.
Furthermore, interviews that were conducted provided original research and
contributed to the overall understanding of the extent to which lessons have been
implemented for first responders in Connecticut. While research had suggested that
first responders in Connecticut were sufficiently prepared and significant efforts had
been made to enhance emergency preparedness and response activities, the first
responders provided the context for those achievements and revealed areas in which
they experienced inadequate preparation and inconsistencies in state-wide emergency
response initiatives.
Areas for Further Study
This work used the State of Connecticut as a case study to determine the
extent to which lessons have been implemented to enhance emergency management

98
practices. Connecticut is not representative of all other areas of the U.S., so further
research should include other states. Particular attention should be paid to states and
regions where the threat of terrorist attack or natural disaster is especially high.
Similarly, a broader range of interviews with first responders would provide a
clearer picture of how prepared Connecticut is to respond effectively to a disaster.
Other people involved in emergency response, such as hospital administrators,
emergency medical services personnel, transportation and public utilities personnel,
and emergency planners and managers could be interviewed to get a sense of how
prepared other agencies are for a large-scale emergency.
While transportation plans and evacuation procedures were examined, in part
through online research, they were not supplemented by interviews with
transportation personnel or emergency managers to identify weaknesses in these
plans. Research could be done to determine if state-wide initiatives have been carried
out successfully or if more work remains to be done to enhance the ability for the
State of Connecticut to evacuate or move large populations in an emergency situation.
More research could be done to assess hospital emergency preparedness and
the ability of the U.S. public health infrastructure to respond to a large-scale
emergency. While recommendations for hospitals and the healthcare system were put
forth in the aftermath of the Northeast Blackout, a review of the status of those
recommendations would be helpful in identifying areas for further improvement.
Furthermore, representatives from the private sector could be interviewed to
assess how prepared they are for an emergency and how effective are their continuity
of operations plans. In general, more research could be done to identify areas where
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the private sector has been proactive in its emergency management practices or areas
where more improvement is needed.
Further research could include analyzing different types of large-scale
emergencies, such as natural disasters and public health emergencies, including the
anthrax scare and the H1N1 outbreak. These would provide additional lessons for
improving emergency management practices. Analysis of international terrorist
attacks, such as the Madrid bombings and attacks on the London public transportation
system, might also offer more insight into how agencies in the U.S. can better prepare
for a terrorist incident. Additionally, while the U.S. has not been the target of a largescale cyber attack, this is an area where the U.S. is particularly vulnerable. Therefore,
more research could be done to understand the response to small-scale cyber
incidents, what the international community has done to prepare for and respond to a
debilitating cyber attack, and ways in which our ability to respond to a cyber attack
could be enhanced.
Further study could include a more extensive analysis of the degree to which
the federal government has acted on recommendations put forth after the 9/11 attacks.
Additionally, while the Department of Homeland Security was created at the
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, there has been some debate about whether
this agency is effective. Some argue that the lack of information sharing and
interagency coordination is being perpetuated because the DHS does not include
agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central Intelligence
Agency, which are an integral part of homeland security issues.
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Additionally, more research could be done to determine how quickly federal
grants are disbursed and if those grants have had a positive impact on emergency
preparedness initiatives. Since Congress is so influential in distributing federal
money to states, their role in emergency preparedness could be more closely
scrutinized as well.
This research has answered the initial research questions. It has proven the
initial thesis to be correct in that there are many ways in which the U.S. remains
deficient in being able to respond to large-scale domestic emergencies. However,
there has been some improvement as seen in the response to the Northeast Blackout
of 2003. Though not within the scope this work, the emergency produced by
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the offshore oil rig explosion of 2010 reflect the
continuing weaknesses. The results of this research are indicative but naturally
cannot be exhaustive. They do, however, point to a rich variety of areas for further
research in the field.
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